

OUTCOME EVALUATION:
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
SYRIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2016-2019)


Final Evaluation Report of Outcome II:
Basic and Social Services & Infrastructure Restoration
to Enhance Community Resilience

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Preface

This evaluation report was commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme – Syria Country Office in order to provide an evidence-based assessment and recommendations for future programming in Syria. The evaluation was conducted between September 2018 and February 2019 across the Syrian Arab Republic by Triangle’s evaluation team in Beirut, Lebanon, as represented by its Directors of Knowledge and Research Sami Halabi and Nizar Ghanem, respectively, and supported in the field by the Damascus-based Capacity Building Centre, represented by its Managing Director Laila Kaddour.



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2. List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community-based organisation
COO	Concept of operation
CSO	Civil society organisation
CPD	Country programme document
DFID	Department for International Development
EQ	Evaluation question
FBO	Faith-based organisation
FGD	Focus group discussion
FHH	Female headed household
GoS	Government of Syrian Arab Republic
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IP	Implementing partner
IDP	Internally displaced person
IDS	Infrastructure Development Survey

KII	Key informant interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluating
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OR1	Outcome research 1
OR2	Outcome research 2
PWD	People with disabilities
RDS	Resilience development survey
SDG	Sustainable development goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework for the Syrian Arab Republic
WHO	World Health Organisation

3. Nomenclature

This report aims to allow readers from different technical backgrounds to understand its findings. As such, the terms and expressions it uses are both technically accurate and widely comprehensible. However, the reader should be aware of the following terms in order to deepen her understanding of its content:

Age classifications: The report employs the following classifications to describe persons of different ages:

- Adolescents: Persons 15-18 years of age.
- Youth: Persons 19-25 years of age.
- Young adults: 26-35 years of age.
- Adults: 36-64 years of age.
- The Elderly: 65 years of age and above.

Beneficiaries: Direct beneficiaries are persons who receive direct support from UNDP, such as emergency employment opportunities alongside their households. Indirect beneficiaries are persons whom UNDP programmes support indirectly, such as those who benefit from the knock-on effects of basic services delivery and essential infrastructure rehabilitation. Indirect beneficiaries are referred to in this evaluation as inhabitants (see below).

Civil society organisation (CSO): CSOs are voluntary, non-profit organisations, distinct from the government and private sector. CSOs advocate for shared public interests, such as—but not limited to—human, women’s or environmental rights or carry out humanitarian relief. CSOs can be organised as associations, community-based organisations, co-operatives, FBOs, NGOs or unions.¹

Faith-based organisations (FBOs): FBOs are organisations whose mission is based on the social values of a particular faith, and who often draw their activists, staff members, leaders and volunteers from a particular faith group. For the purpose of this study, FBOs refer to faith-based organisations that acted as UNDP implementing partners in the areas of UNDP intervention.

Inhabitants: Inhabitants is the word this report uses to describe all persons who reside in a specific geographical area, including residents, internally displaced persons and returnees. (Also referred to in this report interchangeably as ‘indirect beneficiaries.’)

Implementing partners (IPs): Local non-governmental organisations or faith-based organisations through which UNDP implemented its programming.

Internally displaced person (IDP): IDPs are persons who have been forced to leave their homes and have not crossed a border to safety, but have stayed in their country of habitual residence.²

Key informant(s): A person or persons with relevant expertise who provided information relevant to the findings of this evaluation.

Livelihoods: A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (DFID).³

¹ UNDP: Working with Civil Society in Foreign Aid. Accessible at:

<http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP-CH03%20Annexes.pdf>

² UNHCR: Emergency Handbook—IDP definition. Accessible at: <https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/250553/idp-definition>

³ FAO. Tools for Designing, Monitoring and Evaluating Land Administration in Latin America. Accessible at: <http://www.fao.org/in-action/herramienta-administracion-tierras/glossary/s/en/>

Local authorities: Syrian government bodies responsible for administrative regions at the governorate level.

Newly accessible areas: Areas which were previously unstable and have recently opened up for humanitarian and/or development interventions.

Non-governmental organisation (NGO): NGOs are non-profit local, national, regional or international organisations that address issues in support of the public good and/or engage in humanitarian relief.⁴

Programme component(s): The report refers to the multiple programmes implemented under sustainable livelihood opportunities (Outcome 2), as Programme Components. The main programme components are: Solid Waste and Debris Management, Social Services and Basic Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Energy (including electricity and renewable energy) and NGO Capacity Development.

Programme Activities: Programmes activities implemented under Outcome 2 have several subcomponents:

- a) *Solid waste management, including collection, removal, sorting, bio-gas, fuel briquettes, compost, and maintenance of vehicles.*
- b) *Debris management, including collection, removal, sorting, crushing and production of blocks.*
- c) *Social services rehabilitation, including rehabilitation of schools and health care facilities.*
- d) *Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, including sewage, water and electricity networks rehabilitation.*
- e) *Rehabilitation of productive units, including shops and markets.*
- f) *Energy, including rehabilitation of power plants (providing spare parts).*
- g) *Renewable energy, including solar street lighting and solar water heating*

⁴ American Psychological Association. United Nations: Definitions and Terms. Accessible at: <https://www.apa.org/international/united-nations/acronyms.pdf>

These activities are referred to in this report as programme subcomponents to facilitate comprehension.

Social cohesion: Social cohesion is defined loosely as the interactions, relationships, and ties between individuals and communities. Specifically, social cohesion describes respecting diversity—such as, but not limited to, religion, ethnicity, income, politics, sexuality, gender, and age—on both the institutional and individual level.⁵

4. Executive Summary

The United Nations Development Programme – Syria Country Office commissioned this evaluation to appraise its Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme and provide actionable recommendations to inform the agency's Country Programme. The Country Programme consists of the following intended outcomes:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion.

Outcome 2: Basic social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria.

This evaluation report covers Outcome 2. A separate evaluation of Outcome 1 was also conducted and may be read in parallel to provide a complete appraisal of UNDP's Country Programme. Accordingly, this evaluation was designed to appraise Outcome 2 and in particular the following six programme components: Debris Management, Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Renewable Energy, Solid Waste Management, and Solid Waste Removal. This report also employs the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee's criteria to evaluate the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, sustainability and partnerships of Outcome 2.

Primary data collection activities comprised of a nationally-representative infrastructure development survey (1,511 respondents), as well as a total of 12 FGDs and 19 KIs.

⁵ UNDP (2009): Community Security and Social Cohesion. Towards a UNDP Approach. Accessible at: <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf>

Secondary data collection activities comprised of an adaptive literature review of programme documents as well as relevant development and academic literature.

Relevance

UNDP programmes were found to be profoundly relevant to local needs, provide critical services which helped reduce proliferation of diseases, generate employment, and set the stage for wider economic recovery. When combined, basic infrastructure components such as solid waste management interventions, debris removal and solar lighting had societal effects on IDPs' returns, host communities and the revival of local market activity. Even though communities were occasionally consulted during programme design, this process was haphazard and lacked a systematic nature. As a result, the selection of intervention areas and modalities was largely based on local authority recommendations as well as donor priorities and restrictions, all of which limited the ability of UNDP to effectively assess and take into account local community viewpoints.

Effectiveness

Infrastructure rehabilitation interventions—both in isolation and in aggregate—laid the foundation for early recovery and effectively improved living conditions. That said, the scale of infrastructure damage and the cumulative effect of IDPs' returns on remaining infrastructure meant the level of overall need curtailed the effectiveness of infrastructure interventions as a whole. In other words, the base level of infrastructure needs are so extensive that UNDP's programmes alone could not reasonably address them since infrastructure interventions commenced in 2016.

Be that as it may, individual interventions were highly effective, largely achieved their intended outcomes and produced knock-on effects such as spurring market activity, improving communal safety and bolstering social cohesion. Debris removal in particular laid the foundation for other infrastructure projects which restored access to potable water, sewage systems, and managed solid waste. At the same time, renewable energy projects provided energy to a number of health centres and illuminated public spaces, which, in turn, increased perceptions of safety, improved movement at night, and contributed to social cohesion. Water network rehabilitation also improved water quality and reduced exposure to waterborne

diseases. Social infrastructure interventions such as rehabilitation of schools and hospitals and clinics improved access and quality of health and education services, increasing admission and retention rates, respectively.

On a communal level, the cumulative effects of these programmes increased returnee rates, which encouraged both IDPs to return and residents to remain in their communities. Yet despite these positive outcomes, more work is required. For example, more than a third of surveyed participants still experience water shortages and cuts, while awareness of electricity and some renewable energy interventions remain almost non-existent.

Efficiency

Evaluation findings show that UNDP's operations were reasonably efficient, especially given the Syrian context. In fact, community members and local authorities widely felt that UNDP's infrastructure interventions were relatively quick, effective and addressed local needs. UNDP staff were also seen as dedicated, well organised and capable. Even so, programme implementation faced obstacles and inefficiencies. The effect of the security situation, delays in the acquisition of official permissions to operate, inappropriate materials, a lack of expertise, overly-centralised decision making and labour shortages all adversely affected wider outcomes in one way or another. Internally, UNDP monitored interventions by UNDP and by a third party, as well as regular field visits provided weekly/monthly reports to the Country office. However, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) processes are geared towards output level reporting, as longer-term outcome assessments would have been unwarranted and infeasible during emergency programming.

Coherence & Connectedness

UNDP infrastructure interventions fell in line with international and national frameworks. For instance, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were incorporated into programme design and planning at various levels. At the same time, UNDP's programmes fit existing national frameworks such as UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021, the United Nations Strategic Framework in Syria Pillar 2 and the Country Programme Document. Despite the above, there were some elements that could benefit from more coherence. For example, the integration of resilience into programming lacked a consistent, country-wide definition, even if UNDP officially had one. At the same time, while infrastructure interventions provided economic

relief, they were unable to provide local populations with the technical skills required for sustainable employment.

Sustainability

Infrastructure rehabilitation interventions showed some evidence of long-term sustainability. Debris removal, coupled with sanitation rehabilitation and solar lighting had multiplier effects which produced sustainable outcomes such as freedom of movement, safety and market revival. At the same time, rehabilitation of schools increased their longer-term capacity to enrol and retain students, while health clinics were able to admit more patients.

Nonetheless, there are concerns regarding sustainability of certain programmes, and maintenance remains a serious issue for consideration. For example, the longevity of solar lighting projects remains largely dependent on local authorities' ability to maintain solar street lighting and replace damaged equipment parts. Also, lack of sufficient investment in local authorities' capacity building (specifically equipment and human resources), risks the reversal of UNDP infrastructure gains across programme components.

Partnership

As in any other state, regulations in Syria mandate that UNDP partners with local authorities to conduct public infrastructure work, as well as engage with private sector subcontractors to provide technical support when required. While these partnerships were generally effective, local authorities, UNDP and private sector subcontractors occasionally lacked technical capacity during project implementation. The number and quality of technical staff at both UNDP and implementing partner levels also posed several challenges for efficient implementation. UNDP has launched an effort to build IP capacity in some areas, even though this effort is not yet systematic and widespread.

Recommendations

In the years to come, UNDP will need to develop future infrastructure programming to take into account greater area-specific needs and approaches to infrastructure interventions—one which balances people's needs with the directives of local authorities and available resources. Perhaps most importantly, future infrastructure interventions will also need to prioritise

interventions that produce step-changes in public service provision in order to counter the burgeoning (and costly) private sector provision of infrastructure services. Indeed, as is the case in many post-crisis settings, if private sector provision of public services continues to grow, the impetus to build and sustain equitable and affordable public infrastructure may well fade alongside its effects on equality and socioeconomic development. Thus, in order to maintain public infrastructure development, both overarching and programmatic approaches will become necessary and are presented as such in the form of recommendations below.

Overarching recommendations

- Adopt more comprehensive damage needs assessment methods to bolster the existing long-term area-based approach to infrastructure interventions.
- Facilitate the sustainability of interventions through joint-planning, assessment and capacity building with implementing partners.
- Engage donors with evidence of basic infrastructure needs and wider outcomes.

Programmatic recommendations

- Engage local communities in the wider process of programme design and implementation.
- Expand geographical coverage of interventions to include side streets and peripheral areas.
- Integrate infrastructure advances with livelihoods and other programming, and not just through UNDP.
- Integrate civic engagement components such as raising environmental awareness in infrastructure programming to bolster local ownership, emphasising community self-reliance and civic pride.

5. Introduction

Going on nine years, the crisis in Syria has become one of the most complex and protracted humanitarian contexts in modern history.⁶ Overall, 13.1 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, of which more than 4.1 million are in severe need.⁷ Among the most pertinent of those needs today, and no doubt in the months and years to come, will be the process of national early recovery in Syria.⁸ Over half the Syrian labour force is without a job, which reduces income sources, and places additional strains on households' ability to subsist.⁹ The latest available unemployment rates are estimated to be around 53% among adults and 75% among youth (end of 2015).¹⁰ By comparison, the average unemployment rate among OECD countries for adults is 5.3% (third quarter 2018) and 11.1% for youth (third quarter 2018).¹¹ As result of these interconnected factors, poverty has deepened across Syria. The latest available poverty data shows rates up from less than 15% prior the crisis to 85% in recent years, with some 69% living in extreme poverty.^{12,13}

UNDP in the Syrian Arab Republic

Since the beginning of the crisis, UNDP Syria has been implementing a unique Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme that aims to strengthen resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the on-going crisis, as well as enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. In order to provide IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities and access to basic services, UNDP programmes have worked on the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure and services. Different types of livelihood interventions to support early recovery and positive coping

⁶ UNDP (2015): Resilience Building in Response to the Syria Crisis. P. 3

⁷ UN OCHA Syria (August 2018): Humanitarian Response Plan. P. 13

⁸ UNDP (2015): Resilience Building in Response to the Syria Crisis. P. 4

⁹ UN OCHA (November 2017): Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic 2018. P. 19

¹⁰ UN OCHA (November 2017): Humanitarian Needs Overview, Syrian Arab Republic 2018. P. 19

¹¹ OECD (2019): Unemployment Rate. Accessible at: <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart> and OECD (2019): Youth unemployment rate. Accessible at: <https://data.oecd.org/unemp/youth-unemployment-rate.htm#indicator-chart>

¹² The poverty line describes the ability of people to purchase the minimum of necessary goods and services a household requires to survive. Extreme poverty describes the ability of people to purchase only the very basic food and non-food items a household needs to live.

¹³ UN OCHA (August 2017): Human Response Plan, Monitoring Report. January-June 2017. P. 4, 38

mechanisms were provided with special attention given to target female headed households (FHH), persons with disability (PWD) and youth.

In line with the Syria Humanitarian Response Plan, the United Nations Strategic Framework, the UNDP Country Programme Document and the overarching Sustainable Development Goals, UNDP Syria's interventions have been designed in a holistic and multi-dimensional manner with the goals of early recovery, resilience building, and improved livelihoods. The Country Programme included various priority areas and partnerships that were summed into the following two outcomes:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion.

Outcome 2: Basic social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria.

Since the start of the crisis, the focus of the interventions was on supporting the resilience of communities through livelihoods support, restoration of basic services and rehabilitation of local essential infrastructure and social cohesion, as well as economic recovery through supporting small businesses and creating employment opportunities.¹⁴ The programme aimed to provide the aforementioned services to all of Syrians with a particular focus on the most affected communities.

The programme adopted the following guiding principles during design and implementation:

1. Area-Based Approach: In order to identify and respond to the specific needs of affected communities, the UNDP adopted an area-based approach throughout its interventions. The approach used local structures as entry points to ensure that interventions are effective in reactivating local basic services in order to support local production, employment schemes and economy. Through this approach, UNDP engaged with local partners and stakeholders to ensure that planning, implementation and monitoring is responsive to local needs. UNDP has been actively operating in nine governorates, namely Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Latakia, Rural Damascus, and

¹⁴ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 11

Tartous, either through field presence, outsourced personnel, private service providers, or partner NGOs.¹⁵ In recent months, UNDP has expanded operations to include the governorates of As-Sweida, Daraa and Ar-Raqqa.

2. Partnerships and Coordination: The intervention coordinated with local actors such as NGOs, FBOs, and CBOs in addition to several UN agencies within the framework of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), Clusters/Sector Working Groups, and various technical task forces.¹⁶ The Early Recovery and Livelihoods Sector Working Group which provides policy advice and reports on early recovery and resilience is led by UNDP. UNDP is also involved in additional coordination mechanisms such as the UN Country Team, and the Programme Management Team (PMT) to ensure complementarity in implementation and programming between different UN agencies.¹⁷

3. UNDP Approach: Geographical locations of intervention were chosen based on several UNDP criteria. Some of these included the severity of the needs, the capacity for labour absorption and creation, and the presence of local partners to support implementation. Stability and accessibility were also considered.¹⁸

4. Gender Mainstreaming: As part of the plans mentioned above and in line with the UN Agenda 2030, gender was mainstreamed in line with SDG 5 and was implemented accordingly in practice. Women constituted a minimum of 35% of total beneficiaries with targeted activities tailored to address their needs and priorities. From 2016 to 2018, women who worked in Solid Waste Management, debris and infrastructure projects across the nine governorates were provided with 12,305 monthly job opportunities.¹⁹

5. Monitoring & Evaluation Approach: UNDP has three mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the field activities. At times, more than one mechanism was used based on the nature of the activity and the specific context of areas. UNDP used these M&E mechanisms in order to ensure that its projects and programmes were implemented and reached its target numbers.

¹⁵ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12

¹⁶ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12

¹⁷ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12

¹⁸ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 12

¹⁹ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 13

The three mechanisms are: Community-based Monitoring, Third-Party Monitoring and Evaluation, and site visits. Additionally, the UNDP country office in Syria designed and developed an innovative in-house platform in 2014 entitled “Internal Monitoring and Reporting Platform (IMRP)”.²⁰

6. Description of the Intervention

UNDP Syria rolled out an extension of a Country Programme developed for the 2016-2017 period under the overall strategic goal of “enhancing the resilience and socio-economic stabilisation of individuals and communities” by striving to achieve two outcomes: (1) restoring the disrupted livelihoods of the affected communities; and (2) restoring, rehabilitating and maintaining sustainable basic services and infrastructure in damaged areas and host communities. Embedded in each outcome area was an institutional crisis response and capacity development component which targeted key partners.²¹

Programme Outcome 2 Explained:

Outcome 2: "Basic and social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria"

Contributing to Sustainable Development Goals 3, 6, 7 and 9, this Country Programme outcome was aligned with outcome 6 of the UNDP strategic plan (2014 – 2017), “Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-crises and post-disaster situations” and outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021) “Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis”; as well as the second pillar of the Syria-United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSF), 2016-2019, Restoring and expanding more responsive essential services and infrastructure”; national priorities defined in the UNSF, “reactivation of the production process and provision of sustainable livelihood resources for the Syrian population”;

²⁰ UNDP Syria (August 2018): Resilience at the Forefront- UNDP Syria Annual Report 2017. P. 14, 15

²¹ UNDP (January 2016): Country programme document for the Syrian Arab Republic (2016-2017). P. 4

and the third strategic Objective of the Humanitarian Response Plan, “Increase resilience and access to services.”

To stabilise local communities and promote the return of internally displaced persons, UNDP Syria worked to restore and repair basic social infrastructure and services for a target of 11,900,000 people in areas highly affected by the crises.²² Additionally, the intervention and its activities aimed to strengthen the local and national capacities to plan, develop and deliver social services as well as provide emergency employment opportunities for beneficiaries through their involvement in rehabilitation efforts. The local interventions include infrastructure repair and rehabilitation in the areas of: *Debris Removal*, *Infrastructure Rehabilitation*, *Renewable Energy Intervention*, *Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation*, *Solid Waste Management*, and *Solid Waste Removal*. Furthermore, the intervention aimed to support renewable energy supply and emergency rehabilitation of crossline electricity infrastructure.

Under social infrastructure rehabilitation (hereafter ‘social infrastructure’), UNDP Syria restored damaged local schools to support the return of students to classrooms. Additionally, local health centres were rehabilitated to assist the quality and accessibility of health services, while business units were restored to assist shops in resuming their work and generating income. (For the sake of comprehension, this report uses the term ‘basic infrastructure’ to describe all interventions that do not fall under ‘social infrastructure’)

Several activities were conducted to rehabilitate and sustain basic community infrastructure. Sanitation networks such as water and sewage were repaired, as well as electricity and roads. To provide residents with sanitary and safer living conditions, UNDP Syria addressed the issue of solid waste and debris both in municipal management and service delivery. Vehicles, containers, and tools were provided to enhance local solid waste collection and removal services and activities were conducted to remove debris left over from damage caused by crisis.

To support renewable energy solutions and methods, UNDP Syria advocated and installed: grid lighting systems for streets, gardens and commercial districts; water heaters and pumps; solar lighting panels; heating units; and solar electricity units. The installations provide lighting to streets and hot water and electricity to community facilities such as hospitals and

²² UNDP (Nov. 2015) Country Programme Document for the Syrian Arab Republic (2016-2017) P. 15

universities. Furthermore, electricity supply for the public was improved through giving local power plants needed parts, as well as supporting their maintenance to ensure sustainable electricity generation.

7. Evaluation Scope & Objectives

7.1. Evaluation Scope

This outcome evaluation assessed UNDP's programming across its targeted geographical areas during this programming cycle. The overarching purpose of the evaluation was to appraise assistance activities against defined objectives, monitor progress against relevant work plans and produce actionable recommendations on how to improve/adjust the current Country Programme Document (CPD) and future successor arrangements, as well as identify facilitators and challenges in completing planned activities inside Syria. To cover all of Syria, six strategic governorates were chosen for the evaluation, namely Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo, Damascus, Rural Damascus, Hama, and Homs.

Accordingly, this outcome evaluation was specifically designed to appraise CPD **Outcome 2: Basic and social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria, and in particular the following seven components:** *Debris Management, Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Renewable Energy, Solid Waste Management, Solid Waste Removal and NGO Capacity Development.*

In order to provide an objective, evidence-based assessment of outcomes, as well as actionable recommendations, Triangle adopted an action-oriented participatory evaluation approach which assessed Outcome 2 of UNDP's Country Programme. A separate evaluation of Outcome 1 was also conducted in parallel to this outcome evaluation and to provide a complete appraisal of UNDP's Country Programme. Thus, in order to attain a complete overview of UNDP's Country Programme, the two outcome evaluations should be read in tandem.

7.2. Evaluation Objectives

Based on an in-depth review of programme and strategy documents, and coupled with ongoing and consistent correspondence with UNDP, Triangle devised the following set of Evaluation Questions (EQs) to guide this evaluation approach and overall methodology. Accordingly, the primary objective of this evaluation was to respond to the following EQs:

1. To what extent did Sustainable Livelihood Opportunities programme contribute to the stabilisation of local communities as well as the restoration of basic and social services and infrastructure?
2. What were the main factors which affected the achievement or non-achievement of outcome objectives?
3. To what extent were cross-cutting themes (i.e. gender equality, local context specificity) incorporated in the design, implementation and outcomes of UNDP interventions?
4. To what extent did OR2 contribute to national priorities under the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, the UNSF and relevant SDGs?

The evaluation field work for OR1 and OR2 took place over a period of eight weeks from November 2018 to December 2018 and adopted a participatory mixed-methods approach consisting of key informant interviews, focus group discussions and an individual survey for each of the two outcomes. Outcomes were evaluated post-ex; in other words, with research subjects that had previously witnessed or participated with UNDP projects which have run their course.²³

Triangle's evaluation criteria were based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) criteria adjusted to UNDP's programme and presented in the form of an evaluation matrix in Table 1 below.

²³ Due to issues related to beneficiary sourcing, some research subjects may still be involved or be affected by in UNDP projects which are running (See Limitations for more info). In some areas programmes were ongoing with beneficiaries, but only through their IPs and not with funding from UNDP.

Table 1: Evaluation Matrix, Infrastructure and Basic Services

OECD-DAC Criteria	Lines of Inquiry	Data Sources
Relevance	➤ Were a basic/social service and infrastructure needs assessment conducted to determine contextualised outcome objectives relevant to sustainable livelihoods and resilience building?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ Are the different criteria used in the selection of the areas of intervention appropriate to meet the infrastructure needs of local populations?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ To what extent do infrastructure programmes facilitate access to different capitals and the return of displaced populations?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ Was the design of the infrastructure programme and its indicators conducted in a manner which facilitates equal access to services among population cohorts (both directly and indirectly)?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ Are there external factors (e.g. political, economic, security) which are not being addressed which could make basic/social infrastructure interventions more context-specific?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
Efficiency	➤ To what extent did basic/social infrastructure interventions change due to the crises/context? How did these changes affect the efficient implementation of programme/project activities?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ To what extent were basic/social infrastructure interventions implemented in a timely manner (i.e.: following the return of land to sovereign authority or IDP return)?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ How was cost-efficiency assessed and implemented during project execution?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ What internal feedback mechanisms and M&E functions contribute to efficient implementation and successful completion of programme/project activities?	➤ UNDP Staff
	➤ What other indicators can be developed to measure the extent of stabilization of local communities by restoring and repairing basic social infrastructure and services?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ Does internal or external bureaucracy affect Outcome 2's programming? Can internal procedures be adapted so as to facilitate more efficient social services and infrastructural programming?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ Do partners have sufficient capacity and know-how to implement basic/social infrastructure programming in an efficient manner?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs

Effectiveness	➤ What are the key results achieved since the commencement of basic/social infrastructure interventions?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ To what extent did the provision of basic/social infrastructure interventions contribute to building resilience among inhabitants, as well as at the community level?	➤ IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ What knock on, or multiplier effects can be attributed to UNDP basic/social infrastructure interventions?	➤ IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ To what extent has the provision of physical capital facilitated resilience building across under the sustainable livelihoods' framework?	➤ IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ To what extent have basic/social infrastructure interventions changed the life systems of inhabitants in a manner which builds their resilience?	➤ IPs, Inhabitants
Coherence	➤ Are their direct connections between sustainable livelihoods, resilience and basic/social infrastructure interventions?	➤ IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ How does UNDP's basic needs and infrastructure programming complement the work of other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national/regional actors?	➤ UNDP Staff
	➤ To what extent does livelihood and resilience programming feed into the SDGs 3, 6, 7, and 9, Outcome 6 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021) and the second pillar of the UN Strategic framework (2016-2019)?	➤ UNDP Staff
Sustainability	➤ To what extent is the sustainability of basic/social infrastructure projects assessed?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ To what extent will inhabitants be able to maintain basic/social infrastructure after donor funding has ceased?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs, Inhabitants
	➤ Based on lessons learnt, what are the most effective strategies to promote sustainable livelihoods through infrastructure interventions?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs, Inhabitants
Partnership	➤ How were the capacity implementing partners assessed during the design of basic/social services and infrastructure?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ To what extent were local capacities developed to provide basic/social and infrastructure services to the community?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs
	➤ To what extent capacity building take cross-cutting issues into account (such as gender and youth)?	➤ UNDP Staff, IPs

7.3. Implementation Timeline

The evaluation team implemented the activities over a 22-week period according to the implementation timeline in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Implementation Timeline

Evaluation Component	Responsible Office	Month 1				Month 2				Month 3				Month 4				Month 5				Month 6	
		W1 Sept 17	W2 Sept 24	W3 Oct 1	W4 Oct 8	W5 Oct 15	W6 Oct 22	W7 Oct 29	W8 Nov 5	W9 Nov 12	W10 Nov 19	W11 Nov 26	W12 Dec 3	W13 Dec 10	W14 Dec 17	W15 Dec 24	W16 Dec 31	W17 Jan 7	W18 Jan 14	W19 Jan 21	W20 Jan 28	W21 Feb 4	W22 Feb 11
Kick-off Meeting	UNDP + Triangle																						
Preliminary Literature Review & Inception Interviews	Triangle																						
Research Protocol Submission (with Tools)	Triangle																						
Review of Protocol	UNDP																						
Research Protocol Amendments & Approval	UNDP + Triangle																						
Translation and Programming	Triangle																						
Site Scoping & Testing of Tools	Triangle																						
Data Collection Qualitative (Survey/KIIs/ FGDs)	Triangle																						
Translation, Qualitative Data Cleaning	Triangle																						
Analysis (2 Rounds)	Triangle																						
Preliminary Findings Presentation	Triangle																						
Comments gap analysis & report writing	UNDP + Triangle																						
Draft Evaluation Report	Triangle																						
Draft Evaluation Report Submission & Comments Incorporation	UNDP + Triangle																						
Final Report Submission	Triangle																						

8. Evaluation Approach & Methods

With a view to inform future infrastructure and basic services interventions targeting residents, returnees, and IDPs, this outcome evaluation was built upon an action-oriented empirical research methodology. Field research was conducted from November 4, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Primary data collection activities comprised of an infrastructure development survey (1,511 respondents), a total of 12 FGDs and 19 KIIs. Secondary data collection activities were comprised of an adaptive literature review which facilitated feedback of relevant development, journalistic, academic, and grey literature into this report's findings and recommendations.

8.1. Data Sources

Triangle adopted a collaborative approach to the evaluation which entailed cooperation with UNDP on all aspects of evaluation preparations. As part of the collaborative approach, a concept of operations (COO) document which detailed evaluation methodologies and tools was developed and shared with the agency. Triangle entrusted UNDP with the provision of information, feedback, and logistical support required to complete evaluation activities in a reasonably timely and adequate manner. Specifically, sourcing of indirect beneficiaries for survey interviews and focus group discussions, as well as appropriate locations to conduct these activities, were led by UNDP, with the support of Triangle. As long as it did not interfere with objectivity, where possible, partner facilities were used to conduct research activities, particularly FGDs. That said, Triangle maintained the independence and ethical standards of an external evaluation throughout: beneficiary participation was checked to ensure no conflicts of interest were present, and while UNDP representatives' perspectives were taken into account during comment incorporation, findings and recommendations were not altered in any subjective fashion.

8.1.1.Adaptive Literature Review

To fully grasp the nuances of UNDP's programme and its research activities, Triangle conducted an adaptive literature review of programme documentation. The literature review included the programme documents, progress reports, annual reports, studies and assessments as well as the programme's implementation and monitoring data. This literature was framed against the socioeconomic background of Syria since the crisis, and then placed in its historical context and present state. The literature review also considered wider patterns involving economic and social resilience across areas of intervention, and in Syria more generally.

8.1.2.Inception Interviews

Alongside the adaptive literature review, a total of five inception interviews with senior programme staff were conducted to further investigate UNDP's programming and develop a tailored methodology based on evaluation objectives.

8.1.3.Tools Development

Following the inception phase, Triangle developed qualitative and quantitative research tools for field implementation. Specifically, Triangle built questionnaires for FGDs and KIIs, as well as a Resilience Development Survey. The survey was then programmed with open source software on handheld devices.²⁴ To protect the gathered data from unauthorised access, industry standard best practices for encryption and data backups were employed.²⁵ Key Informant Interviews and FDG guides were developed based on evaluation matrix questions and were amended to fulfil the specific context of focus group and key informant profiles. Furthermore, enumerators, facilitators, and interviewers obtained informed consent from all persons involved in the survey, FGDs, and interviews.

²⁴ The evaluation employed KoBo Toolbox, a free programme used to create humanitarian and development research questionnaires.

²⁵ KoBo Toolbox Data Privacy Policy. Accessible at: <https://www.kobotoolbox.org/privacy/>

8.1.4. Testing Phase

Triangle and its field team conducted a scoping and testing mission in the Hama governorate to test all research tools so as to ensure the outcome and quality of evaluation findings. The evaluation team used a mixed-methods approach consisting of quantitative (survey) and qualitative (FGDs and KIIs) methods to cross-check data and triangulate findings. Changes to lines of inquiry and evaluation strategies were then integrated into final evaluation tools for field deployment.

8.2. Sampling Frame and Sample

Field activities were implemented according to a sampling frame agreed upon between Triangle and UNDP. Table 2 provides an overview of the evaluation's overall sample and achieved targets.

Table 2: Field Sample & Achievement Levels

Resilience Development Survey	Totals	Target	Percentage Achieved
	1,511	1,153	131%
Focus Group Discussions	Totals	Target	Percentage Achieved
	12	12	108%
Key Informant Interviews – Management	5	5	100%
	Totals	Target	Percentage Achieved

Key Informant Interviews - Field Staff	5	5	100%
Key Informant Interviews – IP Staff	Totals	Target	Percentage Achieved
	9	10	90%

8.2.1. Infrastructure Development Survey Sampling

The sampling frame of the IDS was devised according to a sampling strategy which reflected UNDP's programming under Outcome 2 (see Table 3).

Table 3: IDS Sampling Criteria

Criteria	Explanation
Coverage	Coverage of all of geographic areas where programmes have been/are being rolled out.
Concentration of assistance	The geographical concentration of assistance is also considered at the governorate-level.
Number of Projects	Number of projects under each outcome component
Amount of support/inhabitants	Within each output component and governorate, the largest number of indirect inhabitants.
Beneficiary profile	Efforts will be made to differentiate between IDPs and host community residents as well as target other vulnerable groups such as female headed households, residents hosting IDPs, etc.
Access and security for enumerators; Do-no-harm	Security of researchers and agency operations has highest priority

Logistical considerations	Availability and access of enumerators will be considered
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Using a list of projects provided by UNDP, Triangle classified projects under Outcome 2 by programme component (Debris Management, Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Renewable Energy, Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Solid Waste Management, and Solid Waste Removal).

Because Outcome 2 components were not implemented directly with beneficiaries, the proportion of indirect beneficiaries (also termed inhabitants in this report) was used as the main metric to identify governorates to be evaluated, alongside the number of projects completed since January 2017. Both indirect beneficiaries and number of projects were calculated as a proportion of the total programme and then assigned equal weight to generate a weighted average score to select governorates for evaluation. Accordingly, the governorates of Aleppo, Hama, and Homs significantly outscored other governorates across all programme components, with the exception of Hama, where solid waste removal was not implemented.

The IDS employed a stratified random sampling method with a 95% confidence level and a 4.3% confidence interval for each cohort. Statistical significance after disaggregation was set at the levels at or above the confidence interval. A random walk sampling was used to survey indirect beneficiaries based on programme components specifics and their distribution across the different governorates. Under each programme component, the largest projects (number of indirect beneficiaries) were selected for sampling in their respective areas. Snowball sampling to capture appropriate strata was also utilised in case random walk sampling did not yield sufficient results (see Table 4).




Table 4: Infrastructure Development Survey Sampling


<i>Project</i>	<i>Aleppo</i>	<i>Hama</i>	<i>Homs</i>	<i>Total number of responses</i>
<i>Debris Management</i>	76	93	121	290
<i>Infrastructure Rehabilitation</i>	85	54	108	247
<i>Renewable Energy</i>	110	113	119	342
<i>Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation</i>	129	159	118	406
<i>Solid Waste Management</i>	141	103	178	422
<i>Solid Waste Removal</i>	-	-	-	-
<i>Total number of respondents</i>	528	509	474	1,511 \ 1,707

The IDS was conducted with a total of 1,511 indirect beneficiaries who provided a total of 1,707 responses.²⁶ The sampling aimed to achieve an equal distribution of participants across the three governorates and ultimately came close to its intended objective: Aleppo (528 participants), Hama (509 participants), and Homs (474 participants). Within each governorate, the evaluation aimed to equally divide the participants between six thematic areas: Debris Management, Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Renewable Energy, Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation, Solid Waste Management, and Solid Waste Removal. For sake of simplicity the two subcomponents Solid Waste Management and Solid Waste Removal were combined as a single subcomponent within the IDS. Across the two outputs, a 1:1 ratio of male to female respondents was aimed at. However, the overwhelming presence of males in public spaces rooted in traditional gender norms meant the sample was skewed towards male

²⁶ Total number of responses (1,707) and total number of respondents (1,511) differ, as some survey participants benefitted from multiple UNDP infrastructure components.

representation (see Figure 2). On the other hand, NGO Capacity Development was excluded given that segment did not engage with beneficiaries directly.²⁷

Figure 2: Resilience Development Survey Data Overview



8.2.2.Focus Group Sampling

²⁷ NGO capacity development was assessed through qualitative research (FGDs and KIIs).

The sampling strategy focuses on geographical differences, the single output of Outcome 2 (as per the UNDP list of projects), and gender in order to understand nuances in a multi-dimensional manner. Specifically, the FGDs covered the six areas of intervention; debris management, infrastructure rehabilitation, renewable energy, social infrastructure rehabilitation, solid waste management, solid waste removal. The FGDs were conducted based on the six areas of intervention (five in the case of Hama), and were applied in the three chosen governorates of Aleppo, Hama, and Homs, disaggregated by gender. The governorates have been chosen based on the numbers of indirect beneficiaries of the aforementioned interventions and the number of projects conducted and completed from January 2017 onwards.

Focus groups adopted a purposive stratified sampling strategy, disaggregated on the basis of gender (when possible), geography, and programme component, as identified in Table 5. A total of 15 FGDs were conducted with inhabitants, including residents, returnees, and IDPs.




Table 5: Focus Group Disaggregation

Number	Gender	Governorate	Programme
1	Males	Aleppo	Debris Removal
2	Males/Females	Rural Damascus	NGO Capacity Building
3	Males	Aleppo	Solid Waste Management
4	Females	Aleppo	Infrastructure Rehabilitation
5	Females	Aleppo	Renewable Energy
6	Males	Hama	Solid Waste Management
7	Females	Hama	Solid Waste Management
8	Males/Females	Hama	NGO Capacity Building
9	Mixed	Hama	Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation
10	Males/Females	Al-Hasakeh	NGO Capacity Building
11	Females	Hama	Infrastructure Rehabilitation
12	Mixed	Homs	Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation
13	Mixed	Homs	Debris Removal
14	Males	Homs	Solid Waste Management
15	Males	Homs	Renewable Energy

8.2.3. Key Informant Sampling

The key informant sampling strategy focused on geographical differences to understand nuances at the governorate level, by choosing the most representative governorates in terms of indirect beneficiaries and total projects completed from January 2017 onwards. Furthermore, key informants were selected based largely on project documentation and relevance (see Table 6). Where not available snow-ball sampling methods were employed for the identification of informants.

Table 6: Key Informant Sampling

Geography	UNDP Field Staff	IP Staff	Local Authority	Number of KIs
<i>Al-Hasakeh</i>	1	2	-	3
<i>Aleppo</i>	1	-	2	3
<i>Hama</i>	1	2	-	3
<i>Homs</i>	1	1	1	3
<i>Rural Damascus</i>	1	-	1	2
UNDP Management, Programme, and M&E Staff				5
Total				19

A total of 19 KIs were conducted with various stakeholder groups. Interviewees included senior UNDP programme staff, UNDP field staff, UNDP M&E staff, implementing partner staff (NGO/CBO/CSOs/FBOs), private sector companies and municipalities. KIs were conducted in Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo, Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Rural Damascus governorates.

8.3. Performance Standards & Theoretical Frameworks

As of yet, there is little consensus as to what the most appropriate frameworks are to understand or evaluate resilience, and there is some argument as to whether the concept is

appropriate at all.^{28,29} But while there is no widely agreed upon framework by which to design and evaluate resilience, there is some consensus around what constitutes the basic pillars of resilience in the humanitarian and development contexts. Most definitions focus on the ability of an entity (individual, household, community, etc.) to absorb, resist, adapt to (long-term) stresses or (short-term) shocks, and finally recover.³⁰ Broken down further, resilience is also generally thought to comprise of four, perhaps general, but nonetheless key components for appraisal: Risk Exposure, Vulnerability, Coping/Adaptation and Recovery.³¹ Similarly, UNDP's resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis were built upon the three aspects of coping, recovering and sustaining.³² Accordingly, this evaluation adopted a systems approach to resilience analysis which merged the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and UNDP's approaches to resilience as the basis for appraisal. The approach is predicated on analysis at the community level (i.e. IDP, host and returnee communities in each target area) and on how those communities' systems are set up to respond to shocks and changes.

In tandem, the systems resilience approach was merged with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework in Figure 1 (adopted by DFID, CARE International and Oxfam) which elaborated on how the well-being of a community functions in a system with six different categories of assets or 'capitals' – financial, human, natural, physical, political, and social capital.³³ Hence, the presence, absence and accumulation of these 'capitals' were covered by this evaluation to measure the extent to which outcomes have been achieved. As such, all capitals excluding political and natural capitals were evaluated under OR1.

²⁸ For an in-depth analysis see: Levine, S. and I. Mosel, Supporting resilience in difficult places - A critical look at applying the 'resilience' concept in countries where crises are the norm, Overseas Development Institute, 2014.

²⁹ MacKinnon, D & Driscoll Derickson, K. From resilience to resourcefulness: A critique of resilience policy and activism. Progress in Human Geography. 2012


³⁰ For some examples see: Levine, S. and I. Mosel, op. cit. & Mitchell, Risk and Resilience: From Good Idea to Good Practice, OECD, 2013.

³¹ Levine, S. and I. Mosel, op. cit.

³² UNDP (2013): Resilience-based Development Response to the Syria crisis.

³³ Ibid.

Figure 3: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Illustrative)



Source: OECD and UNICEF (2014) Final Report: Resilience Systems Analysis, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Finally, under the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, the outcome evaluation appraised activities by cross-checking the systems resilience approach, the sustainable livelihoods framework and the evaluation matrix based on the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluations. In line with UNDP standards for outcome evaluations, Triangle also assigned data sources and collection methods to each line of inquiry in the evaluation matrix (see Table 1).³⁴


³⁴ See Outcome-Level Evaluation: A companion guide to the handbook on planning monitoring and evaluating for development results for programme units and evaluators, UNDP, December 2011.

8.4. Ethical Considerations

Research conducted by Triangle and its field teams took place in accordance with local laws and regulations as well as the adoption of ethical research principles throughout project cycles. As such, Triangle and the field team management first conducted legal and ethical briefings with team leaders and primary data collection staff involved in research activities prior to commencing research activities. During this process, contextual legislation and regulations were reviewed in order to ensure that research activities fell within the laws of any and all localities where the evaluation took place. Subsequently, an assessment of ethical considerations was conducted depending on the research in question.

Once preliminary legal and ethical assessments were completed, Triangle and its field teams developed a project-specific legal and ethical framework and applied them through the evaluation life-cycle. Accordingly, the team leader was tasked with ensuring that legal and ethical guidelines were maintained and upheld. Monitoring and assurance of legal and ethical guidelines were conducted by Triangle and field team management who reviewed progress and project milestones during weekly quality assurance meetings with the team leader.


For Triangle's Code of Conduct, please see Annex C.



8.5. Background Information on Evaluators

The present report is the result of extensive research and analysis conducted between September 2018 and February 2019 by Triangle. An evaluation team comprised of qualitative and quantitative research experts, in addition to field enumerators were assembled and tasked with the design, research and analysis throughout the project.

Figure 4 Project Implementation Organogram



8.6. Limitations & Mitigation Measures

This evaluation was an extensive and complex exercise conducted in an active crisis setting. The evaluation covered an array of inter-related dimensions and aspects across several geographies. Moreover, the evaluation was the first evaluation of the Country Programme conducted by UNDP. Accordingly, this evaluation was subject to numerous challenges as well as methodological and field research limitations, which field teams attempted to mitigate and adapt to (see Table 7).


Table 7: List of Limitations & Mitigation Measures

Methodological limitations	
Limitations & Effects	Mitigation Measures
1. Lack of Baseline: Because of the difficulties presented by the crisis related to conducting nationally representative evaluations, the evaluation team did not possess a representative baseline of needs or resilience to conduct a comparative analysis. Thus, there was no comparison between baseline values and current values to demonstrate progress over time.	Effects are reported as per the responses of the research subjects. Questionnaires were thus devised to qualify timeframes and areas of inquiries to ascertain effects within those parameters.
2. Reliability of data: In terms of reliability, all quantitative and qualitative data are self-reported, something which always subjects findings to an uncertain level of perception bias as well as variations attached to the willingness to disclose data.	All possible measures to reduce such biases—such as anonymity, do no harm and safe spaces—were built into the research methodology.

3. Mixed methods & geography: While the evaluation covered all areas of the UNDP Country Programme, mixed methods research³⁵ was limited to three governorates: Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. This was the result of geographical selection criteria which aimed to provide the most representative reflection of the Country Programme, meaning Al-Hasakeh and Rural Damascus scored relatively low compared to other governorates. This also resulted in neither FGDs nor IDS surveys being conducted in the latter governorates.	Selection criteria accommodated for Al-Hasakeh and Rural Damascus through qualitative key informant evaluation activities (KIIs).
Field Research Limitations	
Limitation	Mitigation Measures
4. Lack of familiarity with evaluations affected sampling of focus groups: Many local IP staff and CSOs were unfamiliar with basic evaluation methodologies and the logistics required to conduct such activities. Despite written guidance from the evaluation team, the lack of familiarity with evaluations meant that the concept of FGDs was consistently misunderstood by IPs and CSOs. As a result, beneficiary samples were not always provided according to the specifications requested by evaluation teams. This was particularly the case with regard to gender disaggregation, where field teams were unable to attain the FGD participant	Evaluation teams and UNDP head office staff extended the evaluation schedule to give additional time for field teams to comprehend sampling strategies. In addition, detailed action plans were mandated prior to employment and further encouragement to redouble efforts was provided and the director-level. Field staff and evaluation teams also rescheduled several FGDs.

³⁵ Mixed methods research is an evaluation tool which builds upon both, qualitative and quantitative analysis.


composition required to provide consistent gender disaggregated findings.	
5. Sampling bias concerning gender and PWDs: The IDS survey was designed to capture the opinions of indirect inhabitants through random walk. Since public spaces tend to be culturally dominated by males, results show a slight over representation of males (65%) compared to females (35%). At the same time, random walk sample could not capture significant number of PWDs (~1%)	Although many of the field teams were witnessing technical problems related to the internet, the analysis team in Damascus and Beirut spotted the discrepancy towards the end of the field mission. Nonetheless, field teams were requested to return to the field to amend the discrepancy to the furthest extent possible. The findings should be read as slightly biased towards males.
6. Mix of agency interventions: In one areas of Hama, an international NGO had partnered with UNDP, but was also running their own livelihoods programmes with beneficiaries who took part in evaluation activities. Thus, there is a risk that outcomes reported were not purely those related to UNDP programming.	Enumerators repeatedly explained to beneficiaries that the questions they were being asked only related to the programmes that UNDP sponsored.



7. **Electricity & Renewable Energy Awareness:**

When IDS survey data was first transmitted to evaluation teams, there were no results related to electricity and renewable energy interventions, even though substantial UNDP interventions did take place in this regard. Triangle field teams re-deployed to areas where sampling was intended to intercept inhabitants who resided in areas where these infrastructure rehabilitation projects had taken place. Again, there was no awareness of these interventions, which resulted in a lack of quantitative data on the programme components.

The lack of quantitative data was compensated for through the use of qualitative data and deeper analysis into the issue of electricity provision, or lack thereof.



9. Data Analysis

Data analysis activities adopted an approach that facilitated continuous feedback loops in order to build findings from the field level, as well as provide a nuanced yet accurate reflection of UNDP's management-level perspectives.

Qualitative data acquired through KIIs and FGDs was analysed according to grounded theory method, also known as Glaser-Strauss method. The collected data was extracted, analysed, coded and marked for analysis purposes. The creation of theory was based on ordering the data into various categories and themes.

Quantitative data was treated and processed using research and data processing software (SPSS 25.0), and cross-tabulations across socio-demographic information were run to form tables on which percentages could be compared, and visual data representation was created accordingly. The data gap analysis delved into disaggregated results in search of any further significance that leads to highlighting particular findings, and builds actionable recommendations accordingly.

After concluding the field research, researchers prepared a preliminary findings presentation and conferred with UNDP for feedback. The purposes of the presentation were two-fold: to present emerging findings of the research and to gauge results against the expectations of UNDP in terms of report quality, content, credibility and neutrality. In addition, the presentation allowed evaluation teams to identify any further points of inquiry and discuss recommendations, as well as the format of this evaluation report and final presentations.

10. Findings

10.1. Relevance

The range of infrastructure interventions was relevant to early recovery, and even more relevant when interventions were combined. Sanitation, waste management and debris removal facilitated physical access to areas, reduced the proliferation of disease and generated emergency employment for local inhabitants. Solar lighting increased social and business interaction, while social infrastructure rehabilitation improved access to, and capacity of schools, health centres and local markets. When combined, programming components were relevant in ways which produced outcomes that had multiplier effects. For example, the combination of debris removal and solid waste management encouraged IDPs to return to their hometowns, while the combination of solar lighting and social infrastructure rehabilitation allowed businesses to reopen and for longer hours.

Donor requirements played a significant role in areas and modality selection. Donor priorities were nearly always the first issue that UNDP field staff took into consideration when selecting areas and programme components. UNDP proposals from the field level did not always align with donor priorities, leading to a mismatch between needs on the ground and donor directives. In Aleppo, for example, UNDP field staff who identified needs on the western side of the city found themselves at odds with donors. In Al-Hasakeh, UNDP wished to install solar lighting, but found themselves unable to do so.

*“We sometimes struggle to persuade donors when it comes to [intervening in] Aleppo”
(UNDP Field Staff, Aleppo)*

*“Donor directives usually define priorities, in addition to the vision of the programme.”
(UNDP Field Staff, Al-Hasakeh)*

UNDP made context-relevant interventions. During the planning stage, local authorities typically recommended intervention areas to UNDP field offices. UNDP then used these recommendations together with field visits to determine the scale of local needs before providing UNDP Damascus with proposed intervention areas. Local authority recommendations were guided by various criteria, including whether areas had become

secure and accessible, while also factoring in population composition (IDP/Returnee/Resident) and density. Local authorities also based their recommendations on specific intervention requests by the local population.

“When we intervene in areas like [redacted] that aren’t a governorate priority, this causes serious dissatisfaction among the local authorities.” (UNDP Field Staff, Rural Damascus)

Local communities were often consulted on programming and component design, but there was no consistent mechanism for doing so. In Rural Damascus, Hama, and Homs, supervisory committees were established at the beginning of projects to monitor interventions. These committees usually included a local municipal officer (*mukhtar*) and representatives from relevant government agencies. In areas such as Aleppo, UNDP consulted local communities during field visits. The functions of local committees, however, were not always standardised and replicated across intervention geographies.

Inhabitants generally agreed that infrastructure interventions responded to their needs, but some interventions were more relevant than others. Interventions which addressed infrastructure issues for which inhabitants had no coping mechanisms—such as debris removal and solid waste management—were most relevant to populations. While electricity was persistently listed as a priority, inhabitants were virtually unaware of UNDP electricity rehabilitation interventions. Social infrastructure interventions were felt to be relevant to local needs, yet to a lesser extent than basic infrastructure. And while NGO capacity building successfully increased NGO workers’ capacity, there was no evidence of an organisation-wide effect.


Specific programming components were directly relevant to most inhabitants’ needs, although coverage remained an issue. In Hama City, residents were satisfied with solid waste management interventions. But in Rural Hama, for example, UNDP staff conceded that solid waste management interventions had only covered a fraction of the area in need. Social infrastructure increased the capacity of partially damaged local schools, clinics, and local markets such as the Old Market in Homs, although it did not typically address facilities needs holistically (e.g. in terms of sanitation repairs).

Inhabitants perceived programming to be focused on major streets and areas, but not side streets and peripheral areas. In Hama, for example, inhabitants perceived that solar lighting targeted main streets and largely neglected side streets. The same was true in solid waste management, which resulted in side streets being less hygienic and littered relative to other areas, particularly in Aleppo. That said, technical specifications related to how solar lighting projects can be installed may preclude future relevance to side streets and peripheral urban areas.

“As a result of this project, we can walk in the streets where we couldn’t walk before, and the cars can enter even if it’s still tricky.” (Female returnee, Homs)

Infrastructure employment was less equitable to some social groups and less relevant to others. During project implementation, the composition of workers was equally divided between IDPs and local residents. However, IDPs were overrepresented in work which was perceived to be of low social status, such as solid waste management and debris removal. UNDP was found to be unable to enforce female representation in projects which employed local inhabitants, specifically because females did not apply to programmes which are labour-intensive traditionally seen as ‘male-appropriate’ such as debris removal, solid waste management or solar lighting installation.

Inconsistent selection criteria and national duties side-lined youth in employment projects. Indeed, infrastructure employment programming rarely targeted specific age categories. When age selection criteria did apply, UNDP only applied a minimum and maximum age restriction (18 and 65 respectively) in areas such as Rural Damascus and Homs. In other areas, selection criteria included quotas for youth, but military conscription limited effective representation.



10.1.1. Geographical Summary (Relevance)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
Priorities are based on a combination of UNDP directives, local authority priorities, donor criteria, accessibility, and number of inhabitants. Once an area has been selected, the UNDP approach area-relevant IPs to assess their priorities and capacity. UNDP sometimes, but not always, conducts needs assessments, primarily based on output- indicators. Local labour supply shortages in Rural Damascus meant UNDP could not always ensure vulnerable group full representation. Local authorities determine intervention areas based on the scale of local complaints. NGO capacity building was generally relevant to individual participants.	Priorities are based on the governor's recommendations. UNDP Damascus and donor directives are a source of tension for field teams when they were at odds with governorate directives. Local inhabitants interested in work can register with local committees, who then select beneficiaries based on UNDP criteria.	Priorities are based on donor criteria and, to a lesser extent, UNDP directives. UNDP were unable to obtain funding for solar energy projects due to overriding donor priorities. UNDP Staff said no specific mechanism for consulting the local community existed at all. NGO capacity building was generally felt to meet beneficiaries' needs, although pre-intervention assessments would have meant greater individual relevance.	Governor provides intervention recommendations and UNDP Damascus takes ultimate decision on where to intervene based on input from field teams. The number of requests to return to the governorate made by residents determines which specific areas to intervene in. Priorities are set by UNDP field staff who conduct field visits to identify scale of needs. These visits allow UNDP to consult with the local community and local authorities.	Priorities were determined through consultation with local government and service providers. During field visits to writeup needs assessments, UNDP sought the opinion of local communities, but did not do so systematically. UNDP field staff who wished to intervene on the western side of the city found themselves at odds with donors.


10.2. Effectiveness

Individual infrastructure interventions enhanced living conditions and laid the foundations for early recovery. The range of interventions restored urban areas and encouraged people to return to their towns and villages. Debris removal opened up previously inaccessible streets and acted as a force multiplier for other interventions, while infrastructure rehabilitation restored access to potable water, public water networks and sewage systems. Renewable energy projects saw the installation of solar lighting which illuminated streets at night, allowed businesses and schools to stay open longer and inhabitants to walk outside at night, and provided electricity to critical equipment in health centres. For their part, social infrastructure rehabilitation projects had palpable effects: more children enrolled in school and retention rates rose while, in health clinics, patient absorption capacity grew. Lastly, solid waste management meant rubbish was collected in places where it had not been for years, which contributed to a renewed sense of pride among the local population.

Yet when asked about the effects of all infrastructure interventions in general, inhabitants felt limited effects on market activity, job creation, and availability of goods and services. More than half of inhabitants (54%) perceived the infrastructure rehabilitation to have had no effect on market activity. Residents felt the least effect, with 64% stating the projects had no effect on market activity, followed by IDPs (46%) and returnees (39%). In fact, only 15% of the inhabitants perceived infrastructure rehabilitation to have had a large effect on increasing market activity (see Figure 5). When interviewed, though, inhabitants in Homs felt that social infrastructure rehabilitation had had a clear effect on generating market activity. And when it came to basic infrastructure, inhabitants in all intervention areas felt that UNDP interventions had paved the way for market recovery, but that substantive economic revival would take time.

"The market was destroyed, there were no shops. You couldn't walk through it. People have re-opened shops and started to shop again." (Female IDP, Homs)


Figure 5: To what extent do you feel that infrastructure rehabilitation has contributed to an increase in market activity?



Accordingly, three in four inhabitants (75%) stated that infrastructure rehabilitation had no effect on job creation. Residents were most likely to perceive no effect on job creation (79%), compared to returnees (76%), and IDPs (61%) (see Figure 6). Similarly, two thirds of inhabitants (67%) mentioned that infrastructure rehabilitation had no effect on the availability of goods and services. Residents in particular felt that UNDP's intervention had no effect on the availability of goods and services (74%), compared to 61% among returnees, and 54% among IDPs. Inhabitants in Hama and Aleppo were cautious about the effects of rehabilitation on jobs: inhabitants felt that while basic infrastructure projects had temporarily created jobs and improved local living conditions, it had not translated into broader effects on the local market. Those in Homs agreed: while the rehabilitation of business units such as the Old Souq meant more job opportunities, the employment generated by the infrastructure projects was necessarily short-term. This finding, however, should be understood when taking into consideration the fact that emergency employment was, by definition, provided on a short-term basis and as part of a broader emergency response.

"[Infrastructure rehabilitation projects] only created jobs for the people who worked with UNDP. They didn't increase jobs on the ground." (Female resident, Hama)

Figure 6: To what extent do you feel that infrastructure rehabilitation has contributed to job creation?



Even though widespread effects on the market have yet to materialise, the overwhelming majority of inhabitants felt that the quality of infrastructure has improved significantly. Almost all inhabitants (96%) perceived the quality of basic infrastructure to have improved since 2016. Residents were the most positive about quality improvements with 63% saying quality had risen to a large extent, followed by IDPs (56%) (see Figure 7). What's more, the majority of returnees (64%) stated that infrastructure rehabilitation had positively contributed to their decision to return, albeit to varying extents (see Figure 8).

Figure 7: To what extent do you feel that the quality of basic infrastructure has improved since 2016?






Figure 8: To what extent do you feel that the rehabilitated infrastructure you have accessed have contributed to your return?




Debris removal had a positive effect on market activity, employment and business revival. Nearly all inhabitants (95%) perceived that debris removal to have had a positive effect on market activity. Residents were most optimistic about the degree to which market activity had increased, with 56% stating that the component had a large effect on market activity, compared to IDPs (40%) and returnees (25%) (see Figure 9). In Homs and Aleppo, inhabitants agreed that debris removal had facilitated the restoration of local businesses and created better conditions for local commerce, both in the Old Souq of Homs and local markets of Aleppo.

Figure 9: To what extent do you feel that debris removal has contributed to an increase in market activity?



Inhabitants recognised the positive effects of debris removal on local market activity, but were less confident about the effect on the availability of goods and services. While 61% of the inhabitants stated that debris removal had some effect on the availability of goods and services, no survey participant stated the effect was large and 39% did not perceive any effect on the availability on goods and services at all (see Figure 10).


Figure 10: To what extent do you feel that debris removal has contributed to the availability of goods and services?



The vast majority of inhabitants (93%) also recognised debris removal to have had a positive effect on the re-opening of shops and businesses in their communities (see Figure 11). Moreover, most inhabitants (91%) also perceived debris removal to have had a positive effect on job creation, with 40% stating that it had contributed to a large extent, 29% stating that it had somewhat contributed and 22% stating it had contributed only a little. When interviewed, inhabitants in Aleppo described how debris removal projects had employed a large workforce at the same time as opening up the streets and markets. In Homs, business owners could only reopen their shops after UNDP removed debris from the streets.

"I'm a driver. When there was debris [in the streets], I couldn't work, but when the debris was removed, I could start working again." (Male returnee, Aleppo)

Figure 11: To what extent did debris removal contribute to the re-opening of shops and businesses in your community?



Most people who worked on debris removal were IDPs. The majority of inhabitants (73%) employed in debris removal were IDPs, followed by returnees (23%) and residents (5%). A local authority IP in Rural Damascus observed that all the inhabitants who took part in solid waste employment projects were IDPs because local residents were too embarrassed to take part in the project. In this context, it is likely that local residents consider debris removal and solid waste management low-status work and were therefore less willing to take part in these projects.

“Everyone working on solid waste management projects were IDPs because the local residents were embarrassed to do the work.” (IP, Rural Damascus)

Debris removal laid the foundation for other infrastructure projects, which in turn improved living conditions. The majority of inhabitants (61%) stated that debris removal led to other infrastructure projects in their communities, such as infrastructure rehabilitation, renewable energy projects, social infrastructure rehabilitation, and solid waste management.

Nearly all of these inhabitants (94%) perceived their living conditions to have improved due to the subsequent infrastructure projects facilitated by debris removal. In Aleppo, for instance, inhabitants asserted that subsequent activities such as road asphaltting and renewable lighting projects would not have happened without debris removal first taking place. Debris removal also allowed inhabitants to save money: When interviewed, inhabitants in Homs explained that by allowing them to return home, debris removal allowed them to save on rent and spend money on other essential costs.

*"There has been a huge difference [relative to before 2016]. Homs was a city of ghosts."
(Male IDP, Homs)*

"When we were outside of town, we were renting. Even though we're sitting on the floor here, we're sitting in our homes and slowly repairing them using the rent money." (Female returnee, Homs)

Debris removal facilitated social cohesion and increased returnee rates, as well as encouraging both IDPs and residents to stay in their communities. When surveyed, most of those employed in debris removal (95%) felt that the projects had facilitated social cohesion between the IDP and host communities (see Figure 12). When interviewed, inhabitants in Aleppo inhabitants stated that debris removal had encouraged people to return to their neighbourhoods and re-opened roads, meaning that people could see and talk to each other more. That said, the 5% who did not feel that debris removal facilitated social cohesion were all IDPs. In addition, all female inhabitants engaged in debris removal stated that the project had very little effect on facilitating social cohesion. Female inhabitants in Homs also felt that the restoration of water and electricity would need to be addressed before genuine social cohesion could truly be restored.

The accumulative effect of debris removal encouraged people to return and stay in their communities. Most residents (85%) surveyed concurred that debris removal had encouraged them to remain in their communities (see Figure 13). As with residents, most returnees (86%) perceived debris removal to have had a positive effect on their decision to return home. (see Figure 14). Furthermore, the majority of IDPs (56%) stated that debris removal had a large effect on to their decision to return to their communities (see Figure 12).

Debris removal had other positive knock-on effects: inhabitants of Homs and Aleppo explained that debris removal opened up roads, improving access to their neighbourhoods and enabling people to return. As these people returned, inhabitants felt safer in their neighbourhoods, which were no longer empty, increasing people’s sense of security and encouraging them to stay.

Figure 12: To what extent did debris removal result in your return to this community?




Figure 13: To what extent do you think debris removal contributed to allowing you to reside in this community?





Figure 14: To what extent did debris removal result in your return to this community?



UNDP's rehabilitation of potable and public water networks improved inhabitants' access to water, although shortages persist. Most (85%) of the inhabitants stated that UNDP's intervention helped them access reliable sources of potable water to a large extent. However, perceptions varied between inhabitants, with more residents (94%) than returnees (68%) and IDPs (75%) feeling that UNDP's intervention helped them to access reliable sources of potable water (see Figure 15). Despite the positive effects of the potable water network rehabilitation, more than a third (34%) of survey participants still experienced shortages and cuts. Potable water shortages and cuts were mostly reported by returnees (59%) and IDPs (44%) and to a lesser extent by residents (19%) (see Figure 16). When interviewed, female returnees in Aleppo said that prior to UNDP interventions, they had been forced to draw unclean water from wells. After UNDP interventions, their access to safe drinking water significantly improved, but the scale of damage to returnees' homes meant that significantly more work needed to be done to fully restore water.

*"The best thing [UNDP] did was to restore our water. When it came back, so did our lives."
(Female returnee, Aleppo)*

"Six months into the army's arrival, we were still filling up our water elsewhere. Once [UNDP] intervened, the water started again." (Female returnee, Aleppo)




Figure 15: To what extent do you have access to a reliable source of potable water?





Figure 16: After rehabilitation, are you experiencing any water shortages and cuts?




Rehabilitation of potable and public water networks improved water quality and reduced inhabitants' exposure to waterborne disease. Nearly two-thirds (63%) of inhabitants stated that water network rehabilitation had a large effect on their access to an adequate amount of water. Besides improving quantity, UNDP's intervention also improved the quality of available water. Following rehabilitation, almost two in three inhabitants (63%) rated the water quality to be very good and no beneficiary perceived the water quality to be poor (see Figure 17). Inhabitants in Aleppo reported that UNDP's water network rehabilitation reduced people's exposure to water-borne diseases, reduced the level of disease-carrying pests, and provided drinking water that no longer caused blindness.³⁶ Inhabitants in Aleppo also reported that the improved sanitation network had increased water pressure and overall reliability.

"The water from the well used to cause us lots of blindness-related issues, particularly among children. This has stopped, thank God." (Female returnee, Aleppo)

³⁶ Water-related blindness may be caused by parasitic diseases such as trachoma or onchocerciasis.

Figure 17: After the rehabilitation, how would you rate the quality of water as an end user?



Sewage network rehabilitation had a positive effect on hygiene conditions, but inhabitants continued to rely on individual desludging. The majority of inhabitants (68%) rated their households' hygiene condition as very good or good following sewage network rehabilitation; only 6% perceived conditions to be poor. Inhabitants in Aleppo reported that public water pipes stopped leaking after UNDP's intervention, even if some houses still contained leaking pipes. Despite a generally positive perception of the sewage network intervention, the majority of inhabitants (61%) continued to see individual desludging as a more effective method than the use of public sewage networks. In Aleppo, inhabitants were pleased with how the UNDP cleaned manholes, replaced pipes and re-opened water networks. However, inhabitants also commented that there were still areas where leaking water caused damage to buildings. In Hama, inhabitants considered that the sewage network no longer flooded the streets, but felt that the sheer scale of detritus in the sewage network would require additional large-scale dredging.

“Sanitation has improved, it used to soak up [the ground] with water, mice and rats would come out. It’s better now.” (Female returnee, Aleppo)

“If we compare to how things were before 2016 [...] things have changed significantly for the better.” (Female resident, Hama)

Renewable energy projects illuminated public spaces and increased perceptions of safety. All inhabitants perceived solar street lighting to have illuminated public spaces in their community, with nearly three in four inhabitants (72%) reporting that solar lighting had a large effect on the illumination of public spaces. Furthermore, every inhabitant surveyed felt safer as a result of solar street lighting, and nearly three-quarters (71%) reported feeling safer to a large extent. Female inhabitants in Aleppo and male inhabitants in Homs agreed that the illumination of public spaces had reduced kidnapping rates and theft as well as reduced harassment.


*“Now that the solar lighting is here, we can go out and stay out late, and send our children to the grocer’s. They don’t say ‘Mum, I’m scared’ anymore because the street is totally lit.”
(Female resident, Aleppo)*

“Tradespeople were afraid to display their goods in the market because of robberies [...] lighting has played a big role in making things safe.” (Male IDP, Homs)

Renewable energy projects contributed to social cohesion by encouraging movement at night. Almost all inhabitants (98%) across all gender and residency statuses felt encouraged to move freely at night, with more than two-thirds saying the lighting helped them do so to a large extent (see Figure 18). Inhabitants in Aleppo reported that children can now walk in the streets after sunset, and students no longer have to study by candlelight or moonlight. Inhabitants of Homs, Aleppo and Hama were all content with the ability to visit their friends and relatives at night. However, inhabitants’ knowledge of UNDP renewable energy projects was chiefly limited to solar lighting: when asked about other renewable energy projects such as small-scale heating or water pumping facilities, survey and interview participants were unaware of projects.

"The most important thing is that the schools which stay open in the afternoon and close late now have lighting, and I no longer have to bring a torch when I get my daughter from school." (Female resident, Aleppo)

Figure 18: To what extent do you believe that solar street lighting has encouraged you to move freely at night?



Solar street lighting was perceived to have increased market activity, enhanced the business environment and increased employment. Almost all inhabitants (98%) reported that the illuminated streets resulted in a better business environment, more so among men (69%) than women (52%). Correspondingly, most inhabitants (89%) perceived the solar street lighting to have contributed to increased market activity, with more IDPs reporting it did so to a large extent (63%) than residents (40%) and returnees (47%) (see Figure 19). The majority of inhabitants (61%) perceived the illuminated streets to also have had a positive impact on employment, with a higher share among IDPs (62%) and returnees (66%) reporting so than residents (53%). However, differences were more significant between the different age groups, with 50% of the youth stating the project did not contribute to job creation at all,

followed by senior citizens (46%), adults (41%), young adults (32%) and adolescents (20%) (see Figure 20). In interviews with inhabitants from Aleppo and Homs, it was clear that solar lighting had enabled businesses and schools to open later.

“I used to work six hours in my shop before going home [...] now I can keep it open for ten hours.” (Male IDP, Homs)

Figure 19: To what extent do you feel that the renewable energy projects have contributed to an increase in market activity?






Figure 20: To what extent do you feel that the renewable energy projects have contributed to an increase in market activity?



Solar power indirectly contributed to community safety by increasing the consistency of social services. A total of 57% of survey respondents perceived solar power to have resulted in more consistent social services. Furthermore, given that inhabitants consistently reported a lack of access to reliable electricity, most inhabitants (94%) perceived renewable energy to be more effective and reliable than conventional energy. Indeed, the perception was held to a large extent by 62% of inhabitants, indicating the extent to which conventional electricity was inadequate (see Figure 21).


"Of course solar energy is more preferable... it makes us feel like we're becoming a developed country." (Male IDP, Homs)

Figure 21: To what extent do you think renewable energy is effective when compared to conventional energy?



Social infrastructure rehabilitation impacted the operational efficiency of schools, hospitals and social centres, yet effects were marginal. While 59% of the inhabitants felt that rehabilitating facilities had contributed to the operational efficiency of schools, hospitals, and social centres in some way, 25% felt that the effects of rehabilitating the facilities on their efficiency had been minor. An additional 41%, on the other hand, perceived no effect at all (see Figure 22).

Figure 22: To what extent do you feel that the rehabilitated facilities contributed to the operational efficiency of schools, hospitals, and social centres?



UNDP's social infrastructure interventions improved access to, and quality of health care services. Prior to the rehabilitation of health centres by UNDP, inhabitants rated the level of their health care services as either good (36%), acceptable (54%) or poor (8%). Following rehabilitation, perceptions of health care services improved significantly, with inhabitants rating the health care services to be either very good (46%), good (41%) or acceptable (13%) (see Figures 23 and 24). In Hama, for instance, a health centre had increased its capacity with the addition of a new floor, which facilitated the hiring of for more doctors and nurses. In Homs, inhabitants were pleased that the UNDP had removed debris from schools and health centres.

*"[UNDP] did an excellent job of repairing all the schools and clinics with debris in them."
(Female IDP, Homs)*

"[UNDP] repaired the health centre in our neighbourhood. We were hoping that it would save us money [...] but it didn't make a huge difference." (Male resident, Hama)

Figure 23: Before rehabilitation, how would you rate the current level of healthcare services?






Figure 24: After rehabilitation, how would you rate the current level of healthcare services?



Almost all inhabitants who benefited from health care services accessed primary health care (96%), followed by secondary health care (4%); no survey participant accessed tertiary health care services. The majority of inhabitants (59%) found healthcare services easier to access health services subsequent to social infrastructure interventions. Ease of access, however,

was gendered: only 44% of women felt access was facilitated relative to 86% of men. In addition, only one in four IDPs (27%) stated access to health care services improved as a result UNDP’s rehabilitation, while shares among residents (70%) and returnees (100%) were significantly higher (see Figure 25).

Figure 25: As a result of rehabilitation, do you find it easier to access health services now?




"We had the provision of social development services such as [...] the 180-degree rehabilitation of health centres that had previously been in a dire state".
(Male resident, Hama)

School rehabilitation improved access to education and increased retention rates, but additional repairs are required. Following rehabilitation, approximately half the inhabitants perceived the school's' quality to be either very good or good, while the other half stated quality to be acceptable or poor. Again, there were differences according to gender: 71% of male respondents reported school quality to be very good to good subsequent to

rehabilitation, compared to 41% of women (see Figure 26). Inhabitants in Homs were satisfied with the rehabilitation of local schools, but Hama inhabitants were more muted in their praise: while UNDP school rehabilitation had started well, inhabitants claimed that UNDP did not follow up on their requests for improved school sanitation and electricity repairs.

“The situation has definitely improved compared to 2016. There were 1100 students before, whereas now there are about 1500.” (Male IDP, Hama)


Figure 26: How do you rate the quality of the schools following rehabilitation?



Most inhabitants (95%) perceived UNDP’s projects to have provided access to safe and well-equipped schools. In fact, the vast majority of survey respondents (89%) reported the rehabilitation of schools to have resulted in higher enrolment rates since 2016. However, perceptions varied among inhabitants, with 60% of IDPs stating that UNDP’s intervention resulted in higher enrolment rates to a large extent, compared to only one in three (32%) residents and one in four returnees (see Figure 27). The fact that approximately double the number of IDPs felt enrolment had increased indicates that UNDP targeting of this social

group was effective. In addition, more than two in three respondents (69%) also stated that school rehabilitation has resulted in higher retention rates.

Figure 27: To what extent do you believe that rehabilitation of schools since 2016 has resulted in higher enrolment?



Social infrastructure rehabilitation contributed to enhanced access to goods and services, and to a lesser extent increased market activity and employment. All inhabitants perceived the rehabilitation of business units and souqs to have resulted in enhanced access to goods and services. Female inhabitants in particular reported these interventions to have had a large effect on enhanced access to goods and services (72%), compared to male inhabitants (56%), likely due to traditional gender roles playing out in women going to market to buy household items (see Figure 28). Effects on market activity were less pronounced. Women in particular were pessimistic regarding the rehabilitation of business units and souqs, with 51% reporting the intervention had not contributed to increased market activity at all, compared to 38% among men. In addition, significantly more returnees’ felt that the rehabilitation had a positive effect on increased market activity, relative to IDPs (68%) and residents (45%) (See figure 29). In Homs, inhabitants were very pleased

with the rehabilitation of the Old Souq, which had been in dire need of repair even prior to the crises. The rehabilitation of the Old Souq allowed tradespeople to return to their shops, which in turn positively impacted the local economy by increasing competition and reducing the price of consumer goods.

Figure 28: To what extent do you believe that rehabilitation of business units and souqs since 2016 has resulted in enhanced access to goods and services?






Figure 29: To what extent do you feel that the rehabilitated social infrastructure facilities have contributed to an increase in market activity?



Similar to the perceived effects on increased market activity, a slight majority of inhabitants (56%) felt that social infrastructure rehabilitation had had a positive effect on job creation. However, perceptions again varied between gender and residency statuses. More men (72%) than women (46%) felt that the intervention had a positive effect on employment, and, additionally, significantly more returnees (96%) than IDPs (73%) and residents (46%) reported the intervention to have had a positive effect on job creation (see Figure 30).

Figure 30: To what extent do you feel that the rehabilitated social infrastructure facilities have contributed to job creation?



Social infrastructure rehabilitation facilitated social cohesion but had inconclusive effects on living conditions. The majority of respondents (75%) perceived social infrastructure rehabilitation to have had a positive effect on social cohesion between IDPs and host communities. Perceived positive effects on social cohesion were significantly higher among returnees (98%) and IDPs (79%) than residents (71%) (see Figure 31). Correspondingly, nearly all returnees (96%) reported social infrastructure rehabilitation to have improved their living conditions, even if shares among IDPs (65%) and residents (45%) were significantly lower. That said, most returnees (89%) stated that social infrastructure rehabilitation had an effect on their decision to return.

"These initiatives have made everyone start work again and talk to each other again. Everyone has started to see that the other side is suffering. The situation is very different now." (Male IDP, Homs)

"I wanted to leave but didn't in the end, because I sensed there was work and reconstruction." (Male, Homs)

Figure 31: To what extent do you feel that social infrastructure rehabilitation initiatives resulted social cohesion between IDPs and the host community?





Figure 32: To what extent do you feel that the rehabilitated social infrastructure improved your living conditions?




Solid waste management interventions improved overall cleanliness and hygiene levels, but coverage remained an issue. Most respondents (87%) reported an improvement in the cleanliness of public spaces of their communities since 2016 (see Figure 33). Accordingly, nearly all inhabitants (97%) perceived that solid waste projects contributed to improved hygiene conditions in their communities. However, while half of the residents (47%) and IDPs (52%) stated that solid waste projects made large improvements to hygiene conditions, only 37% of returnees felt the same. Inhabitants interviewed in Hama reported that solid waste management interventions reduced the level of pests carrying diseases such as leishmaniasis, as well as packs of wild dogs. In Homs, inhabitants felt that public hygiene had significantly improved following solid waste interventions. Inhabitants in Aleppo, however, were less positive on the whole, commenting that UNDP did not cover all areas and that it did not employ enough workers.

"The [UNDP solid waste management] project was extremely positive. I really felt it in all the surrounding areas." (Male resident, Homs)

"The street is clean now. We can now say that we live in this neighbourhood without being afraid that people think we come from a dirty area." (Male returnee, Aleppo)


Figure 33: Have you witnessed an improvement in the cleanliness of public spaces in your community since 2016?



Solid waste interventions resulted in better waste collection and greater environmental awareness. Most inhabitants (85%) witnessed an improvement in solid waste collection since 2016 (see Figure 34), and a majority of respondents (71%) felt that solid waste management projects led to greater environmental awareness. However, almost no beneficiary (3%) had begun to sort garbage at source. Of those interviewed on the subject, virtually no-one admitted to recycling at home. The few who did recycle household waste also reported a lack of adequate recycling facilities.

"I was coming out of my house when I saw lots of workers cleaning the street [...] we found that the situation had improved significantly. I knew they were UNDP from the uniform they were wearing." (Female IDP, Hama)

Figure 34: To what extent have you witnessed an improvement in solid waste collection since 2016?




Solid waste management projects led to increased market activity, but had limited effects on the availability of goods and services as well as job creation. The majority of respondents (62%) stated that solid waste projects have contributed to increased market activity. Despite this, perceptions varied considerably with higher shares among IDPs (81%) and returnees (74%) stating the projects had a positive effect on market activity, compared to residents (55%) (see Figure 35). Inhabitants in Aleppo reflected on the fact that solid waste management projects had improved the local economy, although this also varied by sub-district. In one area of the governorate, for example, several shops had reopened thanks to UNDP solid waste management interventions. Other inhabitants in Aleppo, however, felt that solid waste projects bore no relation to market activity. Similarly, in Homs, inhabitants felt that the limited scope of solid waste management projects failed to stimulate the local economy.

“In our area, the best shops opened because of the [solid waste management] and sanitation projects in the area.” (Male IDP, Aleppo)


“People are still looking for work. It’s true, the [solid waste management] project cleaned the neighbourhood, but that was it.” (Male resident, Homs)

Figure 35: To what extent do you feel that the solid waste interventions have contributed to an increase in market activity?



Similarly, around half of inhabitants (51%) stated that solid waste projects did not have a positive effect on long-term sustainable job creation. Residents were particularly sceptical about the project's effect on this sort of job creation, with only 41% stating it had had a positive effect on employment. By contrast, the majority of both returnees (61%) and IDPs (73%) perceived solid waste to have had an effect on job creation (see Figure 36).

Figure 36: To what extent do you feel that the solid waste interventions have contributed to job creation?



Some infrastructure employment interventions generated sustainable livelihoods outcomes, although the focus on temporary employment meant these were short lived. Although intrinsically short-term, sanitation employment interventions provided market-relevant training for future employment opportunities. However, inhabitants felt that the skills they gained from employment with UNDP would be strictly limited to employment with local service providers, such as municipal waste collection or sanitation services. Other forms of employment generated by infrastructure interventions—such as employment in solid waste removal and solar energy—did not create long-term employment opportunities. Importantly, the limited capacity of local authorities to take on infrastructure projects and hire additional staff raises questions about the sustainability of these projects.

"The support has been both material and moral: material in the sense that people get a salary and can pay their rent, and moral in the sense that they are taking part in cleaning up their homes and their town." (Male IDP, Homs)

The security situation, official permissions and labour shortages reduced effectiveness.

Field staff and IPs largely felt that the security situation had improved across intervention areas, and that security concerns were mitigated by factoring them in at the programme design stage. In some areas, however, the security situation delayed or even prevented UNDP programming. In Homs, the security situation was a considerable challenge for IPs from install solar lighting, while in Hama the market continues to close at 5pm due to security concerns. Waiting for official permissions caused delays in all areas. In Aleppo, the requirement to obtain separate permissions for solid waste management, debris removal, as well as water and sanitation interventions all delayed implementation. In Rural Damascus and Aleppo, labour shortages created further problems, meaning that field offices failed to attract the requisite number of workers for projects.

"In Zabadani, we wanted 100 workers, but only 15 showed up." (UNDP Field Staff, Rural Damascus)

Internal planning and a lack human resources at times reduced effectiveness. This lack of local due diligence meant that IPs sometimes lacked the necessary skills and technical capabilities to implement projects. In Aleppo, field staff also cited a lack of human resources and in-house expertise leading to poor planning practices and in turn, reduced effectiveness.

"There was a large number of women. It broke the barrier of women not working. When we see what happened to them during the work, it certainly changed their lives for the better: good salaries, and they are independent."
(Male resident, Hama)


Infrastructure interventions improved women's resilience by addressing their particular needs. Women, and specifically FHHs found UNDP's infrastructure interventions to reduce particular burdens on their families. For instance, female inhabitants in Aleppo no

longer had to carry water over long distances when potable water networks were rehabilitated. In the conservative city of Hama, women initially hid their faces because of the societal stigma of working in solid waste management, but quickly built confidence and no longer felt stigmatised.

"To be honest, it's hard to have women taking part in debris removal projects as non-supervisors due to the nature of the work." (UNDP staff, Rural Damascus)

NGO training programmes provided industry-relevant skills and enhanced beneficiaries' professional outcomes. NGO training sessions were effective and targeted enough to increase capacity across the different functions of NGOs, including accountancy, communications and project management. Repeated training sessions produced more widespread comprehension of the aid sector and the project cycle. In some cases, the trainings were so effective that they resulted in staff seeking other professional opportunities. However, beneficiaries were not always able to attend multiple training sessions. In Hama, beneficiaries felt that the effectiveness of these sessions were limited because they were only able to attend one round of capacity building training sessions.

"We're more organised now, and we can write reports more quickly."
(Male accountant, Hama)



10.2.1. Geographical Summary (Effectiveness)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
Debris removal allowed people to return to their homes in Harasta, Maaloula and Al-Zabadani. Debris removal created job opportunities, including roughly 100 jobs in Harasta. Social infrastructure rehabilitation increased access to schools and health centres. Infrastructure and livelihoods interventions overlapped: In Maaloula, UNDP ran sanitation vocational training sessions.	Debris removal encouraged former residents to return to Hama. On the whole, inhabitants felt solid waste management interventions improved hygiene conditions as well as reduced the number of insects and wild dogs. However, solid waste management interventions only covered a fraction of the area in need in Rural Hama, while in Hama City residents were satisfied by solid waste management interventions. Solar lighting increased perceptions of safety, allowing people to walk outside at night. Sanitation projects cleaned manholes and improved hygiene conditions. Social infrastructure interventions replanted public	Solid waste management encouraged people to return to their homes. Water network repairs reduced the number of cases of water-related illnesses from 27 to zero. Social infrastructure rehabilitation meant more children could go to school. One school's capacity increased from 20 to 800.	Debris removal allowed people to return to their homes, save money (by saving on rent), and restart their businesses. Solid waste management increased hygiene levels encouraged inhabitants to begin conducting business. Solar lighting installation allowed people to walk in the streets at night and take taxis. Social infrastructure rehabilitation allowed the Old Souq to re-open, enabling access to cheaper goods. Quantitative Findings:	Debris removal encouraged people to return to the city and shops to reopen. However, as people return to the town and clear-out their homes of rubble, the streets begin to fill with debris again, which the UNDP had planned for and were addressing. Inhabitants were mostly pleased with solid waste management interventions, although occasionally commented that UNDP provided an insufficient number of bins and refuse trucks. Water network rehabilitation meant inhabitants had access to running water where previously they had to buy it. However, UNDP sometimes did not re-asphalt roads after repairing water mains. Solar lighting installation encouraged people to return to the city and go out at night, enabled schools to stay open

Solar lighting was installed in the two main streets of Al-Tall, although it was not possible to install them elsewhere in the town. NGO capacity building improved beneficiaries' ability to find work in future, although beneficiaries felt there was a danger training could incentivise people to leave their current CSOs.	parks, increased the number of students going to school and added an extra floor to a local health clinic. NGO capacity building provided beneficiaries with useful professional skills, enhancing their productivity, confidence and, on occasion, salaries. Quantitative Findings: Literacy: Similar to Aleppo, Hama had relatively high education rates, particularly among female respondents, with (45%) graduating from tertiary education. Debris Removal: Almost all inhabitants (99%) perceived debris removal to have contributed to increased market activity, with a higher share among females (59%) than males (39%) perceiving the effect to be very large. Basic infrastructure Rehabilitation: Nearly all inhabitants (98%) perceived that the quality of the basic infrastructure has improved since 2016, yet		Literacy: Compared to Hama and Aleppo, Homs had relatively low education rates, with only 24% holding a tertiary education certificate. Debris Removal: Almost all inhabitants (98%) who reported that debris removal has led to other infrastructure projects felt that living conditions improved due to the interventions, with a higher share among males (58%) perceiving the effect to be large than females (25%). Basic infrastructure Rehabilitation: Following the basic infrastructure rehabilitation, 99% of inhabitants reported to have gained access to potable water. Renewable Energy Intervention: Following the installation of solar street lighting, all inhabitants felt	longer and increased people's sense of physical security. Social infrastructure rehabilitation has made it easier to buy goods in local areas. Quantitative Findings: Literacy: Inhabitants in Aleppo had the highest education rates, compared to Hama and Homs, particularly among female respondents, with (55%) graduating from tertiary education. Debris Removal: Most returnees (91%) stated that debris removal positively influenced their decision to return, with more than half (58%) reporting it did so to a large extent. Basic infrastructure Rehabilitation: Despite sanitation network rehabilitation, most inhabitants (83%) felt that the sewage network was less effective than individual desludging. Renewable Energy Intervention:
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significantly more males (77%) than females (26%) felt the improvements have been to a large extent. On the other hand, 80% of inhabitants reported that basic infrastructure rehabilitation has not led at all to job creation. Renewable Energy Intervention: Almost all inhabitants (96%) stated that solar street light projects resulted in better business environment. Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation: While social infrastructure intervention improved access to health care services, significantly more men (83%) than women (44%) felt that access became easier following the intervention. Solid Waste Management: Solid waste projects have improved the hygiene in communities, with 96% across the inhabitants reporting so.	encouraged to move freely at night. Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation: All inhabitants perceived the rehabilitation of schools to have resulted in retention of students, with almost two thirds (63%) stating it did so to a large extent. Solid Waste Management: Most inhabitants (89%) perceived that solid waste projects resulted in greater environmental awareness and 84% reported having to sort their garbage at source.	All inhabitants felt safe in their communities as a result of solar street lighting, with more females (71%) than males (58%) perceiving the effect of solar street lighting on safety to be large. Social Infrastructure Rehabilitation: Nearly all inhabitants (98%) felt that rehabilitation of schools resulted in higher enrolment rates. Solid Waste Management: Almost no beneficiary (3%) had to sort garbage at source, with slightly higher rates among IDPs (11%) compared to residents (3%), and no returnees.
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10.3. Efficiency

The short-term nature of emergency interventions meant that projects were quickly completed, but delays occasionally occurred. Inhabitants and IPs commented positively on the speed of UNDP implementations. For instance, in Homs and Aleppo, UNDP took a month to complete debris removal. When interviewed, IPs typically reported that projects had been successfully completed on time. However, delays could occasionally occur post-project: In Homs, inhabitants noted that solar lighting was installed in two months, although there was a delay of a month before they were actually used. In Aleppo, UNDP anticipated intervening on more than one occasion when people returned and more debris appeared in the streets. In Rural Damascus, the local authorities commented that UNDP had yet to deliver street lighting that had been promised a year ago.

“UNDP were quick and skilled.” (Male returnee, Homs)

Permission delays and lack of sufficient materials resulted in lower efficiency. While UNDP staff were always able to obtain permissions, waiting for them could cause delays. The lack of permissions reduced the overall agility of UNDP interventions: repeated interventions required multiple permissions from local authorities, and the different types of permissions could increase the administrative burden for field staff, as in the case in Aleppo. A lack of sufficient materials also caused delays to project implementation: in Aleppo, the local authorities highlighted that UNDP had not brought sufficient materials and equipment for the number of workers available.

Most areas were accessible, although the security situation presented some access issues. With the exception of Aleppo and Rural Damascus, intervention areas did not present physical access issues. In Aleppo, it remained difficult to intervene in the countryside, in areas near hot spots, and areas controlled by non-governmental forces in Al-Hasakeh. Intervening was not impossible, but entry and exit could prove challenging, as in Al-Hasakeh and Aleppo's Al-Shaykh Maqsood district. In Rural Damascus, UNDP remained unable to obtain access to

areas which, until recently, had not been under governmental control. In addition, the streets in Rural Damascus were extremely narrow, which proved challenging for implementation.

UNDP usually had strong infrastructure monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices. All UNDP field offices had an M&E team present. These field teams evaluated all interventions, conducted regular field visits to meet inhabitants and provided weekly and/or monthly reports. M&E teams also coordinated with local authorities through fortnight and monthly meetings. However, it was evident that UNDP field office M&E processes prioritised output indicators over outcome measurement, focusing on indicators such as the numbers of indirect beneficiaries reached or temporary jobs created. While only Hama and Rural Damascus field offices reported to have conducted post-implementation impact assessments for infrastructure interventions, the Aleppo field office was currently establishing a specific impact reporting team. In Al-Hasakeh, M&E was conducted on the basis of observation only. On the other hand, local authority IPs reportedly conducted evaluations at the end of every project.

NGO capacity issues are widespread, but UNDP is in the process of addressing the issue. Several NGOs, FBOs and field office teams lack the capacity to implement complex programmes and assess beneficiary-level needs. However, FBOs showed relatively higher levels of organisational capacity than NGOs, including in the areas of project management and the ability to conduct assessment surveys. When there were capacity gaps, NGO capacity building programmes proved effective, especially in project management and accounting. However, a focus on individuals rather than organisational capacity limited efficient capacity building.


10.3.1. Geographical Summary (Efficiency)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
UNDP remained unable to obtain official permission to access Douma. Lack of permissions to access areas slowed down programme implementation. Following up on permissions from government agencies took up programming time. The local authorities commented that UNDP had yet to deliver street lighting that had been promised a year ago. The streets in Rural Damascus were extremely narrow, which proved challenging for swift implementation.	UNDP M&E team were in near-constant contact with project teams to ensure that implementation issues were dealt with promptly. Waiting for permissions to intervene from the local authorities took time. On occasion, low community awareness of interventions required UNDP to spend time explaining why it had intervened in certain parts of the city over other parts. Labour shortages meant project teams were understaffed on occasion.	M&E was conducted on the basis of observation only. UNDP Damascus oversaw the contractor tendering process, making it difficult for local Field Offices to carry out their own evaluation of contractors before implementation. In GoS-controlled areas, the local community's lack of understanding of UNDP interventions and poor security conditions meant contractors occasionally faced demands for money from the local population.	Local authority IPs in Homs felt the quality of contractors was lower than desirable. IPs commented that UNDP could have provided greater administrative support at the beginning of the project. UNDP initially found it challenging to source enough labour for projects. Debris removal implementation faced a number of delaying factors, including inefficient debris disposal and the need to obtain local authority permissions for debris removal trucks.	Local authority IPs highlighted that UNDP had brought insufficient materials and equipment for the number of workers available. It remained difficult for UNDP to intervene in the countryside, hot spots. The narrowness of streets in the Old City made it difficult for UNDP to intervene. IPs also reported access challenges in Aleppo, primarily due to population density. The Aleppo Field Office is currently establishing a specific impact reporting team to enhance its M&E efforts. Local authority IPs commented that UNDP could have paid project workers more promptly.

10.4. Coherence & Connectedness

UNDP programmes were coherent with international and national frameworks, but it was unclear to what extent this was intentional. UNDP field staff consistently identified ways in which infrastructure programming addressed the SDGs. Programming addressed SDG3 (Good Health and Well-Being) by removing waste, rehabilitating clinics and improving/replacing sanitation networks; SDG6 (Clean Water and Sanitation) through its focus on rehabilitating sanitation and providing clean water; SDG9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) by explicitly targeting infrastructure rehabilitation.

UNDP programming was coherent with national frameworks. Programming contributed to UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021, Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis) by creating emergency employment opportunities that reduced the effect of further shocks from occurring. Programming also contributed to UNSF Pillar 2 (Essential Services and Infrastructure) through restored essential infrastructure and access to services.



10.4.1. Geographical Summary (Coherence & Connectedness)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
UNDP addressed SDGs in its programming although no SDG-specific indicators were built into programme design. UNDP coordinated with other actors on the ground, including with WHO during rehabilitation of Harasta Hospital.	UNDP did not directly address SDGs in its programming. In social infrastructure rehabilitation, local contractor IPs had to coordinate with various monitoring bodies line ministries and local authorities' education directorates, all of whom were part of a technical committee responsible project delivery and oversight.	Field staff incorporated SDGs into programme design. Field staff were unable to provide a definition or specific indicators for resilience.	UNDP addressed SDGs in programming but did not build SDG-specific indicators into programme design.	UNDP addressed SDGs in programming but did not build SDG-specific indicators into programme design.

10.5. Sustainability

Debris removal, sanitation, solar lighting, and social infrastructure programming showed evidence of sustainability. Debris removal provided the foundation for all infrastructure interventions and the return of displaced populations. Thanks to sanitation rehabilitation, more people have sustainable access to potable water. Solar lighting has also boosted freedom of movement at night, market activity, and business revival. Provided they are maintained and not stolen, the solar panels are expected to last for 25 years. In Homs' Old Souq business rehabilitation has allowed many traders to return to their shops and generated ongoing market activity. In Hama, inhabitants felt that the rehabilitation of schools and clinics had increased their ability to take in more students and patients.


The absence of sustainability assessments during programme design risks limiting effects to the short-term. Field staff and IPs rarely if at all conducted sustainability assessments during the programming cycle. Without taking into consideration the implications of withdrawal post-implementation, there is a possibility that the effects of programming will be short-lived. There is also a danger that UNDP emergency interventions, if extended, could create dependencies. In Aleppo, UNDP field staff reported that inhabitants had begun to assume that UNDP would remain in the city for the long term.

UNDP withdrawal risks a reversal of gains. When combined with local dynamics, the lack of a sustainability dimension to programming means that some projects may not last as long as intended. Solar lighting was associated with maintenance, longevity, and security concerns, but inhabitants in Homs and Aleppo expressed concern that the state would be unable to afford upkeep costs on the batteries and solar bulb batteries. Inhabitants in Aleppo also felt that, were conventional power to come back, the solar lighting would be made redundant by the installation of conventional-energy street lamps. When it came to solid waste management and debris removal projects, inhabitants in Hama and Homs noted that the positive effects have begun to reverse in some areas. This was due to a perceived lack of refuse containers in residential areas and low levels of civic awareness. IPs in areas such as

Homs, cited problems with handing over projects to the local authorities due to the confusing number of government agencies responsible for project oversight. Local authorities in areas such as Aleppo felt that they would not be able to fund the labour force required to sustain UNDP projects such as solid waste management.

“Two years ago we couldn't sleep in the summer for all the bedbugs. Things are easier now, thank God, but if [UNDP] stopped we'd go back to how it was before”. (Male, FGD, Aleppo)

“We thank [the Director of UNDP in Syria] and would like to tell him that he started projects which have given us some hope, so don't stop half-way down the road'. (Female FGD, Hama)



10.5.1. Geographical Summary (Coherence and Connectedness)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
At the end of every projects, local committees were appointed to monitor post-project success. These committees included representatives from the programme, local government and local community. Sustainability was assessed through field visits and M&E. Private sector IPs were required to provide guarantees for projects post-implementation.	When it came to solid waste management and debris removal projects, inhabitants in Hama and Homs noted that the positive effects have begun to reverse in some areas.	No structured sustainability assessment had been conducted as part of evaluation.	Business rehabilitation has allowed many traders to return to their shops and generated ongoing market activity Inhabitants in Homs and Aleppo expressed concern that the local authorities would be unable to afford upkeep costs on the batteries and solar bulb batteries. However, training is planned for maintenance and battery preservation. When it came to solid waste management and debris removal projects, inhabitants in Hama and Homs noted that the positive effects have begun to reverse in some areas.	Inhabitants in Homs and Aleppo expressed concern that the state would be unable to afford upkeep costs on the batteries and solar bulb batteries. Inhabitants were concerned that solar lighting would eventually be replaced by traditional street lamps, rendering the solar lighting obsolete. Local authorities felt they would not be able to fund the labour force required to sustain UNDP projects such as solid waste management.

10.6. Partnership

Local authorities and UNDP occasionally lacked technical capacity during project implementation. UNDP field staff reported that local authorities' technical capacity sometimes presented challenges to implementation. On occasion, UNDP itself did not have the requisite materials during project implementation, and commented that local authorities could have benefitted from greater expertise in order to provide material recommendations. UNDP field staff also suggested that local authority project reports could have been written in greater detail, noting that there were no other potential IPs that UNDP could work with. On the other hand, IPs also felt that UNDP field offices could have employed a larger number of technical staff to advise on project implementation.

UNDP undertook efforts to increase IPs capacity in some areas, but these could have been more systematic. Individual field offices used various approaches to build IP capacity. In some areas, UNDP ran end-of-project maintenance workshops for local authorities and IPs, but this was not consistently the case across intervention areas. Several UNDP field staff suggested that IPs had gained hands-on experience during the implementation phase. However, UNDP staff also commented that IP capacity gaps remain significant and that IPs would benefit from trainings ranging from HR management to good accounting practices.

10.6.1. Geographical Summary (Partnership)

Rural Damascus	Hama	Al-Hasakeh	Homs	Aleppo
UNDP ran end-of-project maintenance workshops for local authorities in areas such as solar lighting maintenance.	Contractors provided effective support in projects such as rehabilitating social infrastructure. Local capacities were developed during project implementation and afterwards, although not systematically. Field staff suggested that local authority project reports could have written been in greater detail, particularly when it came to projects situated in Rif Hama. UNDP noted that there were few IPs capable of partnering with since CSOs lacked technical experts. UNDP commented that they not been made aware of when specific courses for their IPs provided by UNDP central capacity building team would be held.	Contractors provided effective support in debris removal and electricity network installation.	Contractors were hired to provide support in solar lighting projects. UNDP felt that there were gaps in IP capacity but had not addressed them through trainings or workshops.	UNDP felt that local authorities could have benefitted from more technical experts to provide more detailed advice (e.g. on materials to use in renewable energy projects). UNDP Field Offices could have employed a larger number of technical staff to advise on project implementation. UNDP felt that there were gaps in IP capacity and were preparing plans to address them through training courses or workshops.

11. Conclusions

UNDP's current Country Programme was designed to respond to a context which preceded 2016: a period marked by instability and an emergency across most of Syria. Since then, however, marked changes in the context have meant that communities across the country can begin to rebuild their lives. In response, UNDP and its partners in local government have taken on the gargantuan task of rehabilitating infrastructure in a post-crisis setting. As relative stability sets in and people return to their homes, the need to revamp and sustain infrastructure interventions multiplies, meaning so too does the need for UNDP's basic and social infrastructure interventions.

Foundations established

UNDP's programmes have been both relevant to, and effective in rebuilding the basic and social infrastructure communities require to re-engage in public life, function in the market and build up resilience. Basic and social infrastructure interventions have proved effective on their own, and even more so when they are combined in a contextualised manner. Interventions have also proved to have knock-on effects in communities: there have been considerable improvements in market activity, the business environment, emergency employment creation and public safety as well as the provision of social services.

While these outcomes have begun to provide the bedrock for early recovery, programmes are still challenged by the extent of infrastructure damage wrought by the crisis. That means inhabitants continue to suffer from a myriad of infrastructure-related issues and needs. As a result, most interventions are welcome, relevant and effective in isolation, but even more so when combined and context-specific.

The sequence in which infrastructure interventions have taken place was also found to be highly relevant and effective to the process of early recovery. In particular, debris removal laid the foundation for other infrastructure interventions to be initiated, but also provided inhabitants with an impetus to return to their homes. In turn, the return of inhabitants to their places of residence created a domino effect on the need for infrastructure: more people returning means more pressure on damaged infrastructure, which required more interventions

from UNDP and IPs. At the same time, the increased flow of returnees also resulted in a 'reboot' for local communities: areas have become more economically and socially vibrant, and life is regaining some sense of normalcy.

As such, it is little wonder that coverage also remains an issue. Most infrastructure interventions have been focused on major thoroughfares and social institutions—which is natural given the extent of the damage to these arteries of communal life. Yet because of this focus, peripheral areas and facilities still lay in relative disrepair; inhabitability remains seriously affected by a lack of appropriate infrastructure in these areas.

Sustain and adapt

The scale and conceptual nature of UNDP's infrastructure interventions would not have been possible when the current Country Programme was devised; the level of instability meant that the most basic infrastructure rehabilitation interventions could have been reversed almost instantly by the crises. However, now that the context has changed, programmes have begun to contribute to wider international (SDGs), national (UNSF) and institutional (UNDP Strategic Plan) goals.

As programmes progress, however, there is also renewed impetus to plan infrastructure interventions which are sustained and integrated. An unclear and constantly changing regulatory framework which requires UNDP to obtain various forms of approvals from numerous official entities has reduced efficiency, complicated planning and, in turn, reduced effectiveness. A lack of expertise at all levels has also adversely affected timeliness and delivery.

All of these factors affected the sustainability of interventions. At times, so too did lack of integrated sustainability components in programme design, meaning gains in some places have started to reverse. There were also widespread concerns that local authorities would not be able to maintain the infrastructure outcomes achieved by UNDP due to the fact that the former did not possess the technical expertise or the resources needed to do so.

There is no doubt that UNDP infrastructure rehabilitation interventions have been crucial to early recovery and have considerably enhanced public services, economic activity and living conditions. However, the scale and complexity of damage to both basic and social

infrastructure presents an integrated challenge for the programme: the challenge of rehabilitating infrastructure holistically as opposed to in a one-off or piecemeal fashion. To address this, UNDP will need to engage with all of its stakeholders as well as manage available resources and funding restrictions from donors against planning and expertise levels of UNDP and IP staff, not to mention an uncertain regulatory framework.

12. Recommendations

In the years to come, UNDP will need to develop future infrastructure programming to take into account greater area-specific needs and approaches to infrastructure interventions—ones which balances people's needs with the national and local priorities and available resources. Perhaps most importantly, future infrastructure interventions will also need to prioritise interventions that produce step-changes in public service provision in order to counter the burgeoning (and costly) private sector provision of infrastructure services. Indeed, as is the case in many post-crisis settings, if private sector provision of public services continues to grow, the impetus to build and sustain equitable and affordable public infrastructure may well fade alongside its effects on equality and socioeconomic development. Thus, in order to maintain public infrastructure development, both overarching and programmatic approaches will become necessary and are presented as such in the form of recommendations below.

Overarching recommendations

Adopt more comprehensive damage needs assessment methods to bolster the existing long-term area-based approach to infrastructure interventions.

The combined and context-specific nature of infrastructure needs necessitates a consummate response. UNDP already conducts similar needs assessments in the region to estimate the scale and cost of infrastructure damage.³⁷ Such assessments can and should be conducted with partners in local government to ascertain area-specific needs, costs and priorities for intervention. That said UNDP's focus should be on longer-term sustainable infrastructure

³⁷ UNDP (2014) Detailed Infrastructure Damage Assessment, Gaza 2014. Accessible at: <http://www.ps.undp.org/content/dam/papp/docs/Publications/UNDP-papp-research-damageassessment2014.pdf>

advances which are informed by more systematic and standardised infrastructure needs assessments and intervention criteria. Specifically, UNDP's interventions should focus on combined interventions which can produce a context-specific step-change in people's lives, while being careful not to neglect essential individual interventions such as debris removal. This is particularly the case with respect to reliable and affordable electricity provision, which was a priority identified across geographies.

Facilitate the sustainability of interventions through joint-planning, assessment and capacity building. Ensuring the sustainability of crucial infrastructure rehabilitation programmes such as debris removal and waste management long after UNDP's retreat was one of the gaps of the current programme. In order to reverse this trend, it is recommended that UNDP incorporate sustainability components in programme design as well as increase support to local authorities through the supply of sufficient equipment and maintenance capacity (e.g. waste containers, trucks, and solar lighting replacement parts.) In tandem, UNDP will need to build the capacity of local authorities' staff and workforces to ensure infrastructure maintenance, administration, and consistent systematic local needs monitoring can be streamlined.

Engage donors with evidence of infrastructure needs and wider outcomes. Given the complex nature of the crisis, donor agendas and restrictions around infrastructure interventions will continue to cause issues if they are not addressed. In order to free up resources, the results and costs of damage needs assessments need to be made available so that there is a documented evidence base which quells donor reservations around funding infrastructure development, at least to some extent. At the same time, consistent monitoring, evaluation and public reporting of both progress and outcomes of infrastructure interventions will also create momentum for the donor community to support the future development of basic and social infrastructure.

Programmatic recommendations

Engage local communities in the wider process of programme design and implementation. In order to better contextualise rehabilitation interventions to fit local realities, a wider process of engagement with local communities is warranted. Hence, UNDP

should involve local community councils, municipalities and other local NGOs in the initial needs assessment process, and project's design. At the same time, UNDP should also integrate public consultations and involve local communities in all its infrastructure design, assessments and decision-making, so as to ground-truth assessments and gauge public attitudes to interventions.


Expand geographical coverage of interventions to include side streets and peripheral areas. A significant number of UNDP infrastructure rehabilitation efforts have been concentrated in city centres as well as main boulevards and streets. Understandably, rehabilitation programmes prioritised such areas. However, local populations (and especially IDP populations) also tend to come from peripheral and rural areas. Consequently, and in order encourage IDPs to return to their communities, it is crucial that UNDP expands geographical coverage of interventions to include more side streets, as well as per-urban and rural area infrastructure interventions.

Integrate infrastructure advances with livelihoods and other programming, and not just through UNDP. This evaluation has already shown the efficacy of infrastructure programming on other needs, particularly livelihoods. Accordingly, UNDP should create greater linkages between these two programme areas in order to spur cumulative outcomes and multiplier effects. UNDP cannot do all of the work on its own, and should strive to coordinate with other actors (CSOs, private sector, etc.) so as to ensure that once infrastructure interventions are in place, synergies in implementation and design to sustain those gains can be leveraged by others.

Upgrade CSO capacity building programmes through organisation-wide capacity assessments, with a view towards standardisation. Syria's CSO sector is playing a larger part in providing much needed services to the population, but its fragmentation and implementing partner capacity issues have proved problematic in relation to targeted non-emergency programming. To counter these challenges, UNDP should alter its NGO capacity building programme to focus on organisation-wide capacity building, as opposed to building the capacity of individuals within institutions. This approach should incorporate standardised procedures and practices—such as beneficiary databases, vulnerability scoring, and needs assessments—which implementing partners must adopt to receive UNDP funding.

Integrate civic engagement components such as raising awareness on environmental impacts of infrastructure programming to bolster local ownership, emphasising community self-reliance and civic pride. The tensions produced by the crisis, combined with the effects of involuntary displacement have in Syria have frayed social fabrics and produced widespread apathy, indifference as well as lack of faith in the rehabilitation process. Thus, to improve sustainability, UNDP should consider integrating environmental awareness components into public infrastructure programming, particularly with regard to solid waste management and debris removal components. Expanding programmes such as sorting at the source and communal composting could well provide local populations with ownership of infrastructure advances, as well as induce a sense of civic pride in their community, not to mention the wider human health and societal benefits.

END OF EVALUATION REPORT



13. Report Annexes

13.1. Annex A: Terms of Reference

TOR FOR OUTCOME EVALUATION

UNDP SYRIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2016 – 2019)

1. Background

UNDP's corporate policy is to evaluate its development cooperation on a regular basis in order to assess whether and how UNDP-funded interventions contribute to the achievement of agreed outcomes, i.e. changes in the development situation and ultimately in people's lives. Under the Results-Based Management (RBM) framework - UNDP's core management philosophy- there has been a shift from traditional project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to Results-Oriented M&E, in particular outcome monitoring and evaluation that covers a set of related projects, programmes and partnership strategies intended to achieve a higher-level outcome. An outcome evaluation assesses how and why an outcome is or is not being achieved in a given country context and the role UNDP has played. It is also intended to clarify underlying factors affecting the development situation, identify unintended consequences (positive and negative), generate lessons learned and recommend actions to improve performance in future programming and partnership development.

2. Context

Since the beginning of the crisis, UNDP Syria has been implementing a unique Resilience Building and Early Recovery Programme that aims to strengthen resilience of the Syrian people to cope with the effects of the ongoing crisis and enable those whose livelihoods were severely disrupted to recover and rebuild their lives. Ensuring a well-coordinated response that provides IDPs and their host communities with rapid employment opportunities and access to basic services are enhanced through the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure with special attention for females heading households, persons with disability and youth.

An area-based approach has been adopted from the beginning to design and implement the various interventions in partnership with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Community and Faith Based Organizations (CBOs, FBOs), as well as through direct implementation modality in collaboration with national institutions, local communities and local private sector.

3. Outcomes to be Evaluated

According to the Evaluation Plan of UNDP Syria Country Office, two separate outcome evaluations are to be conducted to assess outcomes 1 and 2 of the Country Programme. They are as follows:

Outcome 1: Households and communities benefit from sustainable livelihood opportunities, including economic recovery and social inclusion

This Programme Outcome aims to contribute to Sustainable Development Goals 1, 2, and 8, and is aligned with outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021) “Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis” and falls with the third pillar of the United Nations Strategic framework (2016 – 2019) “Improving the socio-economic resilience of the Syrian population”.

UNDP Syria works on the reactivation of the production process and provision of sustainable livelihood resources for Internally Displaced Persons, host communities, returnees and crisis-affected areas; initiatives are designed to promote recovery of Micro-Small and Medium Enterprises, support to market-relevant vocations and vocational training, value chain recovery, agricultural livelihoods, as well as creation of new businesses opportunities.

Within those interventions, specific initiatives were tailored to target and address needs of the increasing number of Persons with Disabilities and Females who became the only bread winners of their families.

Youth are also a major focus by identifying their different needs, priorities and challenges arose from the crisis, employment support and skills development are used as entry points to promote social cohesion and engaging them in several communal activities.

Non-governmental organizations and Faith-Based Organizations are crucial in delivering livelihood interventions in the targeted geographic areas, as well in engaging local communities.

Outcome 2: “Basic and social services and infrastructure restored, improved and sustained to enhance community resilience in Syria”.

This Country Programme outcome aims to contribute to Sustainable Development Goals 3, 6, 7 and 9, and is aligned with outcome 3 of the UNDP Strategic Plan (2018 – 2021) “Strengthen Resilience to Shocks and Crisis” and falls under the second pillar of the United Nations Strategic framework (2016 – 2019) “Restoring and expanding more responsive essential services and infrastructure”.

UNDP Syria works on the stabilization of local communities and promoting the return of Internally Displaced Persons by restoring and repairing basic social infrastructure and services in severely affected-crisis areas with limited access, this includes activities such as: repairing schools, rehabilitating health facilities, supporting debris management and rehabilitating roads, sanitation networks, commercial areas and businesses as well as restoring electricity supply and renewable energy sources.

The local projects are being implemented in close cooperation with local authorities, municipalities, technical directorates, Local NGOs and local communities; local private sector is involved too in rehabilitation activities.

4. Evaluation Purpose

The main purpose of these 2 outcome evaluations is to assess the extent to which the Country Programme outcomes 1 and 2 have achieved their results over the years of the Country Programme (2016-2019). The evaluations will provide an opportunity to ensure accountability to stakeholders in managing for results, and are also of a useful learning exercise, especially in relation to informing the formulation of the new Country Programme Document for UNDP, which will begin in 2019 onwards. The main users of the evaluation will be UNDP, both implementing and development partners as well as national key partners.

5. Evaluation Objectives

- Evaluate impact of the implemented interventions and its contribution to the stabilization of local communities and restoration of basic and social services and infrastructure;
- Assess contribution that current outputs have made/ are making to the progress towards achieving the planned results of the second outcome of UNDP Syria Country Programme Document as well as identifying unintended positive/ negative results;
- Examine how this outcome contributes to national priorities (UNSF), UNDP SP and relevant SDGs;
- Assess the outcome and relevant output against relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability in supporting early recovery priorities and assessed needs;
- Assess level of integrating gender equality, conflict sensitivity, environment concerns elements in the programme implementation
- Assess partnership strategy in relation to outcome;
- Review links/joint activities with the other UNDP Outcome and its programmes and how these have contributed to the overall achievement of the Country Programme Document.

6. Expected Deliverables

The key product expected from each outcome evaluation is a comprehensive analytical report that follows UNDP's corporate standards (see attached template), the report must:

- Identify strengths and weaknesses in the current Programme/Projects in terms of design, management, implementation, human resource and available resources;
- Identify major factors that facilitate and/or hinder the progress in achieving the planned results, both external and internal factors
- Extract challenges, lessons learnt and best practices;
- Identify priority areas of focus for future programming and the way forward
- Provide recommendations for improvements/ adjustments for the current CPD and future successor arrangement.

7. Scope of the Evaluation

Geographical Coverage

The evaluation should cover all target governorates where UNDP has implemented the local projects including hard-to-reach areas, i.e.: Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Hama, Tartous, Latakia, Aleppo, Al-Hassakeh and Deir-Ez-Zour

Outcome analysis

- What is the current situation and possible trend in the near future with regard to the outcome?
- Whether sufficient progress has been achieved vis-à-vis the outcome as measured by the outcome indicators?
- To what degree UNDP's projects have incorporated the cross-cutting themes i.e. gender, conflict sensitivity...?
- Are the stated outcome, indicators and targets appropriate for the current situation in Syria?
- Whether the outcome indicators chosen are relevant and sufficient to measure the outcomes?

- What are the main factors (positive and negative) within and beyond UNDP's interventions that are affecting or that would affect achievement of the outcome? How have or will these factors limit or facilitate progress towards the outcome?

Output analysis

- Are the current outputs relevant and linked to the achievement of the outcome?
- Has sufficient progress been made in relation to these outputs?
- What are the factors (positive and negative) that affect accomplishment of the outputs?
- What is the quantity, quality and timeliness of outputs? What factors hindered or facilitated the achievement?
- Are the current indicators appropriate to link these outputs to the outcome, or is there a need to improve these indicators?
- Any risk analysis (short, medium and long term) has been undertaken?

Partnership Analysis

- Whether UNDP's key and implementing partners have been appropriate and effective;
- Were partners, stakeholders and/or beneficiaries involved in the design of UNDP's interventions? If yes, what were the nature and extent of their participation? If not, why?
- How have the key and implementing partners contributed to the achievement of the planned outputs?

8. Methodology

An appropriate mix of qualitative and quantitative methods will be used to gather and analyze data/information in order to offer diverse perspectives to the evaluation, and to promote participation of different stakeholders.

The final decision about the specific design and method for the evaluation should be developed in consultation with UNDP Management, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer and UNDP Programme team on the basis of what is appropriate and feasible to meet the evaluation purpose, objectives and answers to evaluation questions.

The outcome evaluation should be carried out by using available data/information to the greatest extent through a wide participation of all stakeholders including UNDP Syria, key partners, local institutions, NGOs, FBOs and CSOs as well as field visits to selected project sites, the collected data should be disaggregated by gender, age and location.

The evaluation team must propose a methodology and plan for this assignment which will be approved by UNDP Management and Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, the proposed approach should include study questions, data required to measure indicators, data sources and collection methods that allow triangulation of data and information.

9. Evaluation Team and Required Capacity

The evaluation team should comprise of international/ national experts with high levels of technical, sectoral and policy expertise; rigorous research and drafting skills; and the capacity to conduct an independent and quality evaluation. The number of evaluators must be determined by the lead evaluator who submits the proposal depending on the requirements of the assignment. Either a team of consultants or a consulting firm could submit proposals in response to this call for proposals.

The following requirements must be fulfilled by the Evaluation Team leader, the Evaluation Team and/or the Consulting Firm.

One Team Leader should have:

- A minimum of 5 years' experience in programme/ policy evaluations, monitoring and evaluation, strategic planning and result-based management
- Experience and subject knowledge in sustainable livelihoods, youth empowerment, social cohesion, reconstruction and crisis response programs, gender would be an added advantage
- Equivalent of a Master Degree in areas of Economics, Business Administration, Statistics, or any other related field of study;
- Professional level in both written and spoken English and Arabic

Team members (minimum 3) should have:

- A minimum of 3 years of relevant professional experience, including previous substantive evaluation experience and involvement in monitoring and evaluation and result-based management (preferably in sustainable livelihoods, social cohesion, gender empowerment, and youth empowerment)
- Equivalent of a Bachelor Degree in Economics, Business Administration, Statistics, or any other related field;
- Good command of both written and spoken English and Arabic

Team Leader and Team members should have:

- Prior hands-on experience in conducting programs/ policy level evaluations
- Proven experience with quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis; participatory approaches
- Experience in using results-based management principles, theory of change /logical framework analysis for programming;
- Excellent understanding of the local context in each area
- Proven ability to produce high quality analytical reports in English
- Ability to bring gender dimensions into the evaluation, including data collection, analysis and writing
- Strong interpersonal skills and ability to work with people from different backgrounds to deliver quality products within a short timeframe
- Be flexible and responsive to changes and demands;
- Be client-oriented and open to feedback.

Consulting Firm should:

- Be a legally registered entity
- Have accessibility to the Syrian governorates as required. Offeror shall submit within its proposal documents or information proving this request.
- Have a minimum of five years' relevant experience in providing similar services in the region and especially in Syria
- Demonstrate an ability to engage a technically and managerially sound team to perform the required services and an ability to conduct concurrent/multiple assignments.
- Not have a conflict of interest in providing similar services to relevant implementing partners, it must be completely impartial and independent from all aspects of interests. A duly signed statement shall be submitted within the proposal as confirmation of no conflict, impartiality and independency.

- Litigation and arbitration history of the Offeror does not bear any potential reputational or other risks for UNDP
- Financial indicators to prove long-term sustainability and possession of the sufficient sound financial position to ensure it can meet its financial commitments under this TOR.

General Required Competencies:

- Knowledge on UNDP programming principles and procedures; UNDP evaluation framework, norms and standards;
- Knowledge of Early Recovery approach and UNDP Response
- Demonstrate integrity by modeling the UN's values and ethical standards;
- Promote the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP;
- Display cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability;
- Fulfill all obligations to gender sensitivity and zero tolerance for sexual harassment.

10. Description of tasks

Evaluation Team Leader	Evaluation Team (3 members minimum)
Lead the entire evaluation process, including communicating all required information with UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	Assist the Evaluation Team Leader in the collation and desk review of Programme Documents
Finalize the research design and questions based on the feedback and complete inception report	Based on the approved inception report, assist in the coordination of data-gathering activities, including focused group discussions with clusters of respondents
Leads the coordination and conduct of data gathering activities: desk review, focus group discussions	Assist in data gathering: Field interviews and focus group discussions;
Data analysis, final report consolidation and submission	Data analysis and drafting of report
Deliver and Present the draft final report to the Reference Group	Co-present the final report and document comments

11. Key Performance Indicators

Performance Attribute	Performance Indicator
Quality of Service	- Timely performance of monitoring, data collection and evaluation as agreed - Timely submission and quality of reports - Efficiency of contractor personnel - Contractor flexibility - Effective and efficient solutions of problems and recommendations
Professional interaction with UNDP area officer and implementing partners	Highest standards of integrity and competence

12. Timeframe for the Evaluation Process

The duration of each outcome evaluation is up to 45 working days, as follows:

Activity	Duration
Inception Phase	12
Desk review of key documents, Evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan	4
Finalizing the evaluation design, methodology and detailed work plan	5
Preparing and finalizing an inception report	3
Data Collection and Analysis Phase	23
Desk preparations	3
Data collection and field visits	15
Analysis and Synthesis	5
Reporting stage	10
Preparation of draft evaluation report	5
Submit draft report to UNDP	1
Review of the draft report with UNDP Management for QA	2
Incorporating additions and comments provided by UNDP CO	2
Submission of the final evaluation report to UNDP Syria	0

Overall duration of the whole assignment should be within 5 months


13. Reporting line

All works defined in this ToR should be reported to the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer will inform UNDP Management, Programme Team and other teams in the CO as well as Field Offices when required.

14. Confidentiality

Data gathered, analysis generated, and any information related to the evaluation for UNDP Syria belongs to UNDP Syria and should be used by the contractor solely for reporting to UNDP Syria and may not be used for any other purpose by the contractor.

End of ToR



13.2. Annex B: Tools

13.2.1. Focus Group Discussion Questionnaire

Evaluation of UNDP's Country Programme 2016-2019 "Basic Service and Infrastructure Rehabilitation" **Focus Group Discussion Guide**

Facilitator Instructions

1. Purpose of evaluation

In order to provide an independent assessment of the quality of the work, we have been asked to conduct an evaluation of UNDP's programme in Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. For this purpose, we will conduct interviews and focus groups discussions.

2. Where do we conduct focus group discussions?

Focus group discussions should only be carried out in safe and secure place, and where respondents will not feel expected or pressured to respond in a certain way. Facilitators should have assessed the location where FGDs are taking place against these criteria during scoping visits which take place before FGDs commence. If facilitators witness the presence of any authority figures or persons who could alter or intimidate respondents, they should contact their field coordinator and relevant UNDP Staff to enquire about whether to hold the FGD. In turn, FGD facilitators should also ensure that there are no UNDP representatives present or within earshot of the space during the time of the FGD.

3. How do we select beneficiaries for FGD?

FGD participants have been selected based on specific criteria and their access to the services provided under the basic services and infrastructure rehabilitation programme. UNDP representatives will be responsible for bringing participants to the location where the FGDs will be held, as per pre-defined criteria. Approximately 6-8 participants will be part of each FGD conducted.

4. How to conduct focus group discussions?

The FGD will take approximately 60-90 minutes to complete, depending on the depth of the responses provided; the participants will be informed of this in advance.

During the FGD, please:

- Ask each question (below) using identical language;
- DO NOT express your own opinion or express support or lack of support to any opinion;
- Demonstrate the required flexibility during the dialogue paying attention not to divert too far from the specific talking points;
- Let the respondent choose his/her own words – do not correct or paraphrase;
- Encourage the respondent to offer more information by asking follow-up questions and probes.
- Be aware of time constraints and feel free to politely interrupt the respondent and move on to the next question if the respondent is being overly-repetitive or not offering additional insight.
- Beneficiaries often overly-emphasis on the fact that assistance provided is not sufficient and needs to be increased. While this is an important dynamic to be explored, do not let the magnitude of aid become the central element of the interview once/if such a dynamic takes place.

5. Presentation & Informed Consent

At the beginning of the FGD, please read the informed consent statement, explaining the purpose of your work and that you are conducting an evaluation of UNDP's activities in order to provide an independent assessment of the quality of the services provided as well as the effects of that service on the life and conditions of beneficiaries. Also be sure to explain that the information obtained during the FGD will be treated as confidential and participants won't be quoted personally; rather, the information will be combined with the responses of other beneficiaries in order to contribute to improving UNDP's operations in Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and across Syria. Facilitators must also clarify that beneficiaries will not receive any services or compensation from participating in the survey.

Once the above has been explained, enumerators must establish informed consent by asking respondents if they have understood and agree to the terms, purpose and intention of the survey. Only when respondents state that they have understood and agreed to the terms, purpose and intention of the survey, should enumerators commence with questions.

Accordingly, the following statement of consent should be read out loud before commencing activities:

Hello, my name is _____ and I am part of an independent evaluator conducting an evaluation of the UNDP in Syria on community members' perceptions of their work being carried out in Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. We are looking at all the infrastructure assistance that the UNDP offers in your communities.

The reason you have been selected because you reside in an area where one or more of UNDP's infrastructure programmes have taken place. All participation in this discussion is voluntary. If you agree to participate in this discussion, all your responses will be kept anonymous and confidential, and neither the UNDP nor anyone else will see your individual responses. Results of this discussion will not be shared with your neighbours or any authority, and any results will not be reported in any way that is mixed with that of other so that it is impossible for your responses to be identified. Your names are not asked for or used but we ask only so that we can facilitate this discussion.

If you do agree to take part now, you can change your mind at any time during the focus group without any implications. The discussion poses no risks to you or your health. However, if a question causes any anxiety or discomfort you may also choose not to answer without giving a reason.

This discussion should take approximately 1 hour to complete. Do you have any questions that you would like to ask before we begin?

[Ensure that each participant provide verbal consent, and the facilitator signs off on informed consent.]

6. Questions

During FGDs, the free flow of the discussion between participants and the facilitator is the most important facet of the focus group. However, all main question areas will need to be covered, so please do not skip any of the main questions or probes. For each question try to establish **instance, degree, frequency and dynamics** as instructed during training.

As guidance, the questions below should be covered during the FGD. Texts in brackets are instructions to the facilitator, and not to be read out to the participants.

Focus Group Discussion Guide

A. Ice Breaker / Prep

1. [Around the room, each participant separately] I would like to start the conversation by getting to know each one of you a bit better. What is your first name, how many people in your family, etc.?
2. I want us all to think back to a time before the crisis, and how things have changed in this community. I will start by asking a few questions about how life has changed:
 - a. Can you please explain the state of infrastructure in your communities between then and now?
 - b. Can you please explain to me how this has affected your lives? (Probe: specific examples of coping mechanisms)

B. General:

Now, I want to ask some general questions about UNDP's assistance to your households and the infrastructure services implemented in your community:

1. Who here knows about infrastructure services/projects implemented by UNDP in the area?
[The FGD assistant should make a note on a checklist of how many persons have benefited from different activities of the infrastructure programme: debris management//basic infrastructure//renewable energy//social infrastructure//solid waste management.]
2. Can you give me specific examples of how the crisis has affected the quality of basic services and infrastructure in your community?
3. How would you all evaluate the real effects of infrastructure projects implemented in your area? (Probe: Economic effects, social cohesion effects) [Do not let the conversation go off track, just cover general impressions and issues here.]
 - a. Are there any major issues?
 - b. Are there any significant achievements?
4. Can you tell me if the infrastructure projects have benefitted the entire community or only specific segments of the community i.e. do the projects have widespread effects or are they confined to one area or one segment of society (Probe: for most vulnerable such as FHH, IDP, youth, PWDs)
 - a. What about living conditions, have they changed as a result of the infrastructure projects [Please explain how]?
5. Did the implemented projects change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
6. Who here is an IDP? [If any:] Did these projects help improve your integration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?
7. Who here is a returnee? [If any:] Did these projects help improve your reintegration in the local community (Please explain why/why not)?

[TAKE BREAK IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE BY FGD FACILITATOR]

C. Programmes: Specific programmes implemented by UNDP.

DEBRIS MANAGEMENT FGDs (If applicable):

1. Now I want to focus on the debris removal from your area. Can you give me your opinion of how the programme was implemented on the ground and its effects on your community?
 - a. Probe implementation: Time of debris team arrival, speed of implementation, professionalism and safety.
 - b. Probe effects: Was debris removal complete, did it facilitate access to home and businesses, etc.

2. Did debris removal result in other forms of infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction in your area? (If yes/no, please explain)
 - a. If yes, what kind of infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction took place and where? (Probe knock on effects)
3. Did debris removal result in better living conditions in your community?
 - a. If so, which segments of society/areas benefited the most? (Please explain)
4. Did debris removal change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
5. Did debris removal result in safer neighbourhoods (Probe: landmine clearance, hygiene, and public hazards)?
6. Aside from what has been done so far in terms of debris removal, what else would you recommend could be done to result in better outcomes?
7. Has debris removal contributed to improved relations between IDPs and local residents? (Please elaborate on how and why)
8. Do you feel that any improvements that resulted from debris removal projects can be sustained in the future, or do you feel that the effects will remain short term? (Probe: Conditions required for effects to be sustained)

INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION FGDs:

1. Now I want to focus on the infrastructure rehabilitation in your area. Can you give me your opinion of how the projects were implemented on the ground and their effects?
2. Which of the infrastructure rehabilitation projects did your community benefit from?
 - a. (If a potable water network rehabilitation) How would you describe your access to potable water following the rehabilitation of the network? (Probe: relative quantities and water quality)
 - b. (If *local* electricity network rehabilitation) How would you describe the electricity current following the rehabilitation? (Probe: quality of current compared to time before rehabilitation)
 - i. Are there still any electricity cuts now? If so, how regular are they compared to before 2016?
 - c. (If *wider* electricity networks have been rehabilitated) How do find the current electricity coverage in the entire area relative to before the rehabilitation?
 - i. Are there still any electricity cuts now? If so, how regular are they compared to before the crisis?
 - d. (If sewage network was rehabilitated) What is the current status of the sewage network in your area now relative to before 2016?
 - i. Do think this intervention has affected the general hygiene situation (if so/not, please explain)?
 - ii. Do you think it has eased the burden of individual desludging? (If so/not, please explain)
 - e. How would you describe the overall situation of the water network in your area relative to before 2016? (Please elaborate) (Probe: water quality and quantity)
3. Did these infrastructure rehabilitation projects change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
4. Did these projects result in the restart/operation of small businesses and souks? If so, what effect did this have on the wider community and society?
5. Was there any effect on your access to the basic services as a direct result of the infrastructure projects implemented in your area?
6. Have infrastructure projects contributed to improved relations between IDPs and local residents? (Please elaborate on how and why)
7. Do you feel that any improvements that resulted from infrastructure projects can be sustained in the future, or do you feel that the effects will remain short term? (Probe: Conditions required for effects to be sustained)

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION FGDs:

1. Now I want to focus on the social infrastructure rehabilitation in your area, meaning the rehabilitation of schools, hospitals and businesses. Can you give me your opinion of how the projects were implemented on the ground and their effects?
2. How would you describe the current status of the social infrastructure in your area, relative to before 2016? (Probe: Physical quality of facilities, service quality)
3. What social infrastructure rehabilitation has your community benefited from?
 - a. (If health centres were rehabilitated):
 - I. How would you describe the access to healthcare in your area relative to before 2016? (Probe: coverage and quality)
 - b. (If schools were rehabilitated):
 - I. How would you describe the current situation of schools relative to before 2016?
 - II. How would you describe the situation of students returning to schools relative to before 2016? (Probe: teaching quality, increases in enrolment/retention)
 - III. What are the accesses to education problems that persist despite the rehabilitation? (Probe: shortage in educators)
 - c. (If businesses were rehabilitated):
 - I. How would describe the situation of local businesses and souks relative to before 2016? (Probe: coverage and quality)
 - II. In your opinion, are the rehabilitated business units and souks have a direct impact your lives in any manner? (Please explain, if yes or no)
4. Did the social infrastructure rehabilitation projects change the way the local economy functions, for instance in terms of market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
5. Have these projects improved living conditions in your communities? (Please explain, in both scenarios)
6. Do these projects bring back a sense of normalcy to community life? (Please explain)?
7. Have social infrastructure projects contributed to improved relations between IDPs and local residents? (Please elaborate on how and why)
8. Do you feel that any improvements that resulted from social infrastructure projects can be sustained in the future, or do you feel that the effects will remain short term? (Probe: Conditions required for effects to be sustained)

RENEWABLE ENERGY FGDs:

1. Now I want to focus on the installation of renewable energy facilities (mainly solar street lamps) in your area. Can you give me your opinion of how the projects were implemented on the ground and their effects on the community?
2. How would you describe the impact of solar street lighting on your daily lives? (Please elaborate)
3. Is anyone aware of the installation of small-scale heating/water pumping facilities in your community? If so, can you tell me how they have changed the water provision to homes and businesses in your community?
4. In your opinion, do you solar street lamps have an impact on physical security at night? (If so/not, please explain) (Probe: Going out at night, social life enhanced, looting, security of women and girls)
5. Are solar heating units preferable to conventional energy? (if so/not please explain)
 - a. [If cheaper] Other than being cheaper, are there any other reasons you prefer or favour solar water heating? (Please explain why/why not?)
6. Did the installation of renewable energy systems* change the way the local economy functions, for instance market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further) (Probe: longer working hours for shops and restaurants, increased activity after sunset, etc)

7. Have renewable energy projects contributed to improved relations between IDPs and local residents? (Please elaborate on how and why)
8. Do you feel that any improvements that resulted from renewable energy project can be sustained in the future, or do you feel that the effects will remain short term? (Probe: Conditions required for effects to be sustained)

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT FGDs:

1. Now I want to focus on solid waste collection in your area. Can you give me your opinion of how solid waste projects were implemented on the ground and their effects? (Please elaborate)
2. How would you describe the status of solid waste (garbage) collection in your area relative to before 2016? (Please elaborate)
3. How would you characterize the public hygiene situation following the solid waste collection interventions? (Please elaborate)
4. In what ways are you participating in the recycling of garbage in your area? (Please elaborate) (Probe: do they think it is important or not)
5. How have the garbage collection methods changed and in what ways? (Probe: new trucks, better equipment, more garbage containers, etc.)
6. Did the garbage collection change the way the local economy functions, for instance market activity or job creation? (Please elaborate further)
7. Have solid projects contributed to improved relations between IDPs and local residents? (Please elaborate on how and why)
8. Do you feel that any improvements that resulted from solid waste projects can be sustained in the future, or do you feel that the effects will remain short term? (Probe: Conditions required for effects to be sustained)

D. Sustainability & Conclusion:

1. Do you think UNDP's interventions helped your community cope with the socio-economic challenges posed by the crisis? If so/not, how?
2. What do you think could be done to ensure the continuity of infrastructure services and facilitates without external support from the UN?
3. If UNDP's assistance were to end today, what effect would that have on your community?
 - a. What effect do you think ending UNDP's support would have on these facilities and services?
4. If you had ten minutes with the Director of UNDP in Syria, what would you say to them regarding UNDP's activities in your area?
5. Is there anything else you would like to add, perhaps something of interest you feel UNDP should know about?

END OF FGD DISCUSSION GUIDE

13.2.2. KII – Field Staff Questionnaire

Key informant interview guide – UNDP Field Staff – Infrastructure

Understanding Resilience:

- 1) How would you assess the current infrastructure situation, both basic and social in the areas of UNDP's interventions?
 - a) What are the main problems faced by you as a UNDP Frontier Staff?
 - b) What are the main problems faced by the communities?
 - i) Probe: Access to debris removal
 - ii) Probe: Access to social infrastructure facilities (health care, education, business unit rehabilitation.)
 - iii) Probe: Access to basic infrastructure services (roads, electricity, sewage networks, and water both potable and household.)
 - iv) Probe: Access to solid waste management. (Solid waste removal, technical capacities, tools being used, etc.)
- 2) Does UNDP have a specific definition of resilience which you use in your area?
 - a) If yes: what is it and how is it applied?
 - b) If no: How do you translate *resilience* into the basic services and infrastructure rehabilitation interventions?
 - c) How is community and HH resilience monitored at field levels?
 - i) Are there baseline indicators? [Probe: regulatory of monitoring and methodology].

Programme Design:

- 3) What are the current programmatic priority areas in your area?
 - a) How does UNDP identify these priority areas?
- 4) How are projects designed in your area?
 - a) Who participates in this process?
 - i) To what extent do implementing partners // local authorities participate in designing projects/setting the programme agenda (and implementation for local authorities)?
 - ii) What are the mechanisms that UNDP employs to ensure that local communities and local governments are consulted in the design of programmes?
 - b) How does the process differ between LV and Infrastructure programming?
 - i) How are programme priorities defined in your area?
 - c) How are communities and beneficiaries selected for interventions in your area?
 - d) How are your implementing partners (IPs) selected?
- 5) To what extent did the outcomes contribute to national priorities under the UN Humanitarian Response Plan, the UNSF and relevant SDGs?
 - a) Probe Infra: SDG 3 (Good Health & Well-Being), SDG 6 (Clean Water & Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable & Clean Energy), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation & Infrastructure); UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021 Outcome 3 (Strengthening Resilience to Shocks and Crisis); UN Strategic Framework Pillar 2 (Restoring & expanding more responsive essential services & infrastructure)

- 6) Has infrastructure rehabilitation programming been in effect long enough to result in desired outcomes? If not, should the design be altered accordingly?
- 7) To what extent is your programme able to ensure equal opportunities in the infrastructure rehabilitation sector among different groups? (please explain if so, how/if not able, why not). How do you do so in practice?
 - a) Are you currently able to target all groups you intend to?
 - i) Probe: women/FHH, IDP/host, PWD, youth
- 8) In your view, what is the impact of interventions in the infrastructure rehabilitation sector? [Impact: outcomes; projection]
 - a) Was there a substantial increase in the beneficiary's ability to access the services and facilities?
 - b) How did the intervention result in the availability of goods and services in the area?
 - c) To what extent do interventions help enhance job creation and increase economic activity?
 - d) To what extent did the beneficiaries' attitudes towards their future and ability to cope with the effects of the conflict change? (living conditions and improved livelihoods)

Implementation:

- 9) What factors facilitated or hindered your programme achievements?
- 10) What challenges did you face in achieving certain objectives and/or reaching targets?
 - a) Probe: access, permissions, community, trust, internal/external factors
- 11) In your view, what impact does the infrastructure rehabilitation programming have to beneficiaries' livelihoods?
 - a) Probe: Ability to earn an income, sustaining a job, building professional networks
 - b) Does the rehabilitation of business units, schools, and healthcare centres secure improved living conditions?
 - i) How do you assess that?
 - c) Does the rehabilitation of electricity, water, potable water, and sewage networks secure improved living conditions?
 - i) How do you assess that?
 - d) Does the debris removal secure improved living conditions?
 - i) How do you assess that?
 - e) Does the solid waste management secure improved living conditions?
 - i) How do you assess that?
 - f) To what extent do you feel interventions help enhance the labour market, aid in the availability of goods and services, and increase economic activity?
 - i) How was that assessed?

Synergy and sustainability:

- 12) How do the infrastructure rehabilitation interventions complement the work of other UN agencies, NGOs, donors and national/regional actors?
- 13) How is the sustainability of the infrastructure rehabilitation interventions assessed?
 - a) What can be done to increase sustainability of these activities?

- b) To what extent did existing networks and institutions support and facilitate the implementation of the project? (i.e. local organizations, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations)
- c) To what extent were local capacities developed? Do you think these are strong enough to facilitate continued access to the facilities and the services they provide in the community?
- 14) Do you think there are potential synergies between the infrastructure rehabilitation sector and others, such as livelihoods and social cohesion, which should receive more focus (funding) to increase effectiveness?
- a) Has infrastructure rehabilitation contributed to social cohesion, particularly between IDPs and host community residents?
- b) Do you think the rehabilitation of business units, basic and social infrastructure, debris removal, and solid waste management interventions enhanced the labour market and current/potential employment opportunities in the area?
- 15) In your view, what could facilitate the impact of the infrastructure rehabilitation programming which hasn't been considered so far?

END OF INTERVIEW

13.2.3. KII – Implementing Partners' Questionnaire

Key informant interview guide – IP – Infrastructure

Current state of environment:

- 16) What are your company/organization's tasks and how are project delivery and implementation methods, timeframe, etc. determined with UNDP?
- 17) How would you assess the current infrastructure situation, both basic and social in the areas of UNDP's interventions?
- a) What are the main problems faced by you as an implementing partner?
- b) How would you describe your working relationship with UNDP? Are there any major issues / important achievements you would like to highlight?

Project Design:

- 18) What is your role in the process of setting up the project specifics with UNDP?
- a) How are project priorities defined?
- b) How are the areas selected for interventions?
- c) Were you aware of an infrastructure rehabilitation needs assessment to determine objectives? (How/why not)
- i) If so, who did it affect your work?
- 19) Do you coordinate with local authorities? If so, can you please explain that process and how it affects your project work?
- 20) Do you think that the infrastructure rehabilitation you are implementing is suited to the context where you work and the communities affected by the crisis?

- a) Does the task you were asked to undertake include a clause to ensure that equal access to facilities opportunities in the infrastructure rehabilitation sector are made available to different groups? i.e. IDPs, host community, women, vulnerable men, female-headed households, people with disabilities, youth.
- b) Were you required to alter objectives to adapt to a changing environment? (if that was the case)
- c) What factors were essential for achieving project objectives?
- d) What factors made it difficult to/prevented your company/agency from achieving certain objectives and/or reaching targets?
- 21) In your view, what is the impact of interventions in the infrastructure rehabilitation sector? [Impact: outcomes; projection]
- a) Was there a substantial increase in the beneficiary's ability to access the services and facilities?
- 22) Was the sustainability of the implemented infrastructure rehabilitation projects assessed? In your opinion, what can be done to increase sustainability of these interventions?

Implementation:

- 23) What factors facilitated your team objectives' achievements?
- 24) What challenges did you face in achieving certain objectives and/or reaching targets?
- a) Probe: access, permissions, community, trust, internal/external factors
- 25) In terms of the workers who were hired from within the community, where you provided with any form of criteria for selection of these workers? If so, please explain/

Synergy and sustainability:

- 26) Was the sustainability of the infrastructure rehabilitation interventions assessed? If so, can you please explain how?
- 27) In your view, what could facilitate the impact of the infrastructure rehabilitation programming which hasn't been considered so far?

END OF INTERVIEW

13.3. Annex C: Code of Conduct

Triangle's Code of Conduct lays out ethical standards which ensure the protection of, and respect for informants, clients, and programme beneficiaries, as well as Triangle employees, consultants, partners and their employees. Further, the Code of Conduct is designed to ensure effective processes and accountability for assignments. Triangle all those contracted by it (hereafter: staff) shall act by, and uphold the core values and guiding principles laid out in the document below with respect to in all their professional activities to avoid misconduct in workplace settings³⁸. Outside of workplace settings, staff should uphold the standards set out in this code of conduct so as to ensure that no ill repute comes to themselves or to Triangle. Senior personnel at Triangle have a particular responsibility to uphold these standards and shall set a good example in all their activities.

To ensure that the Code of Conduct is enforced at all times, Triangle will train its staff on its Code of Conduct regularly. External research personnel contracted by Triangle will be instructed on research subjects' protection. Triangle is also committed to keep its Code of Conduct updated and will inform and educate its internal and external staff about any updates.

Core Values and Guiding Principles

Do no harm

Triangle's "Do no harm" philosophy commits to the values of the Charter of the United Nations, the respect for human rights, social justice, human dignity, and respect for the equal rights of men and women. The "Do no harm" approach minimises research risks for all stakeholders, while seeking greatest benefits for research projects. To ensure the minimisation of risks to stakeholders, Triangle and its staff respect research subjects' decisions on participation (in whole or in part), will always ensure voluntary and informed consent of research subjects, as well as will make effort reasonable effort to protect research subjects from foreseen risks (e.g. through safe places for focus group discussions and key informant interviews).

Respect and equality

Triangle and its staff acknowledge and respect local cultures, customs, and traditions and always take into account cultural differences and corresponding approaches. As such, all stakeholders (i.e. research subjects, staff and clients) will be treated with courtesy and respect. The selection of research subjects will be fair and based on circumstances on the ground. Triangle and its staff will act—and interact with all stakeholders—truthfully and without deception at all times. Triangle is also committed to treating all stakeholders fairly, regardless of gender, ethnic, national or religious background, age, disability, marital status, parental status or sexual orientation.

Vulnerable groups

Triangle and its staff are aware that vulnerable groups (such as—but not limited to—children, youth, women, and people with disabilities) are predominantly prone to violence, exploitation and/or neglect, which gives extra reason to commit to handling their participation in the research process according to internationally-recognized best practices. Triangle and its staff also recognise, respect, and understand the physical and emotional privacy of participants of the vulnerable populations. Apart from emotional safety, Triangle and its staff recognise the need for a physically safe environment to conduct research activities and will strive to ensure gender- and context-sensitivity at all times. Furthermore, Triangle and

³⁸ A 'workplace setting' is defined as any location or conveyance used in connection with Triangle's activities, including, but not limited to Triangle's offices, client offices, field research locations, conferences, social events connected with Triangle or its clients, email correspondence or phone conversations.

its staff will strive to facilitate accessible venues for PWDs to secure their participation in the research process.

Quality of work and fairness

Triangle offers a comprehensive approach to its work to impress upon stakeholders competence, integrity, and honesty. By agreeing to an assignment, Triangle acknowledges to have understood projects' objectives, to possess staff qualified to achieve those objectives, as well as to have the necessary capacity to process the assignments' tasks. Triangle always seeks to establish a mutual understanding with clients about objects, scope of work, and workplan. Furthermore, Triangle stands for fairness and impartiality and acknowledges the fact that all disputes are multifaceted. For this reason, Triangle and its staff will seek to provide balanced objective reporting, no matter the complexity of the subject at hand. Triangle and its staff will abstain from personal opinions and will confine themselves to evidence-based reporting and recommendations.

Confidentiality and privacy

Triangle is aware of the sensitivity and confidentiality of data collected in the field. Therefore, Triangle and its staff will protect the privacy of research subjects and will not disclose any confidential information (such as names, addresses, etc.) unless prior approval by the research subject is provided. Qualitative and quantitative information gathered during the research process will be used in an aggregated format or will be cleaned from identifying information to ensure that any agreed upon anonymity is upheld.

Conflicts of interest

Triangle strongly avoids conflict of interest to rule out biased objectivity in its research process. However, in case conflicts of interest occur, Triangle and its staff will inform all parties involved in a transparent manner and endeavour to remove or mitigate the effects of any conflicts of interest. Triangle and its staff and the work they produce is and will always be independent, and will not be influenced by political or social pressures or economic incentives, bribes or favours.

Harassment and anti-fraternization

Triangle is committed to providing a safe environment for all its staff and stakeholders free from discrimination on any grounds and from harassment at work including sexual harassment.³⁹ Triangle operates a zero-tolerance policy for any form of sexual harassment in the workplace, treat all incidents seriously and promptly investigate all allegations of sexual harassment. Any staff member found to have sexually harassed another will face disciplinary action, up to and including dismissal from employment. All complaints of sexual harassment will be taken seriously and treated with respect and in confidence and no one will be victimised for making such a complaint.

Triangle also recognises that anyone can be a victim of sexual harassment, regardless of their sex and of the sex of the harasser. Triangle recognises that sexual harassment may also occur between people of the same sex. What matters is that the sexual conduct is unwanted and unwelcome by the person against whom the conduct is directed.

Triangle also upholds anti-fraternization policy which prohibits all supervisor-subordinate romantic relationships and requires staff to notify Triangle's management of romantic relationships with other staff, so that the Triangle may place the staff in different departments or projects. Any relationship that interferes with the company culture of teamwork, the harmonious work environment or the productivity of employees, will be addressed by applying the progressive discipline policy up to and including

³⁹ Sexual harassment is defined as an unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which makes a person feel offended, humiliated and/or intimidated. It includes situations where a person is asked to engage in sexual activity as a condition of that person's employment, as well as situations which create an environment which is hostile, intimidating or humiliating for the recipient. Sexual harassment can involve one or more incidents and actions constituting harassment may be physical, verbal and non-verbal.

employment termination. Adverse workplace behaviour—or behaviour that affects the workplace that arises because of personal relationships—will not be tolerated.

END OF CODE OF CONDUCT

END OF DOCUMENT

